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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ISSUES OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLE IN WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP

Beirut SHU'UN FALASTINIYAH in Arabic No 118 Sep 81 pp 45-77

[Article by George Nasif: "A Symposium: Issues of the National Struggle on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip"]

[Text] Participants: * Majid Abu Sharar, Abu 'Ali Mustafa,
Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, Muhammad Khalifah and 'Arabi 'Awwad.
Moderator: Bilal al-Hasan.

This symposium was held at the PLO Research Center on the morning of 3 July 1981. The discussion revolved around a working paper that was prepared by SHU'UN FALASTINIYAH. The paper included eight questions about the various issues of "the national struggle on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." Five of these were discussed during the symposium. Participants in the symposium answered the remaining three questions in writing.

Those who participated in the symposium were: Majid Abu Sharar, member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement; Abu 'Ali Mustafa, undersecretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]; Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, undersecretary of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP]; Muhammad Khalifah, al-Sa'iqah's representative in the PLO Executive Committee; and 'Arabi 'Awwad, an officer of the Palestine Communist Organization on the West Bank.

We are publishing in this issue the first part of the symposium which includes answers to three questions that have to do with the situation in general, with the questions of national unity and those of relations with the Jordanian regime. In the next issue we will publish the second part of the symposium which contains answers to questions about trade union activity, military activity, actions on prisoners and on settlement and answers to the question of establishing a unified communist party.

Bilal al-Hasan: On behalf of the Research Center and SHU'UN FALASTINIYAH Magazine we welcome you and we thank you for accepting our invitation to discuss the issues of the national struggle on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We believe that

* 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad, secretary general of the Arab Liberation Front excused himself from participating in the symposium because he was not going to be in Beirut.

there is absolutely no dispute over the fact that the Palestinian struggle in the occupied areas is one of the most important questions that should occupy your attention. Allow us to begin this discussion by saying that the struggle of the Palestinian masses in the occupied areas and the initiatives undertaken by the masses and the political leaders inside the country are still moving ahead of the guerilla organizations' measure of interest and degree of effectiveness. In other words, many of the organizations--and some of them are represented here--pay attention to the condition of their organization inside the country; they outline that organization's policies and tactics on the basis of that organization's ambitions and the standard of its relations with the masses and with other political and guerilla forces.

As a result of this preoccupation with themselves, the interests of the public are sometimes lost. These organizations consider the proclamation of political statements about these interests sufficient, while the responsibility for taking action and making final decisions is left to others.

For example, the organization inside the country works by itself. The organization inside the country forms bilateral alliances according to its interests and the degree of its strength without paying too much attention to the public alliances that are required. The organization inside the country plans its trade union battles by itself for the purpose of gaining control and not for the purpose of building an effective trade union in which all [members] would participate. The organization inside the country devotes attention to its prisoners, not to prisoners as a whole. These are examples [of what is being said]; these may be summarized in the statement that our action inside the country lacks a unity of command that is at least equal to the unity of command manifested within the framework of the PLO's Executive Committee. This is a serious situation whose gravity manifests itself especially when we face a political situation about which opinions and positions may vary. What has been happening so far is that the masses inside the country are rallying around the PLO's policy out of their own sense of awareness. It is not the other way around. In other words, this rallying around the organization did not come about as a result of the influence guerilla groups have in popular circles.

First, we want to hear what your opinions are on these observations. Do you agree with them? Or do you think there is another realistic view? After that we will discuss the areas of national action inside the country one by one.

1. Alliances Inside the Country

Majid Abu Sharar: First of all, we may not separate what goes on inside the country from what happens on the outside. Most of the actions that take place on the political scene and on all other scenes inside the country reflect the policy of each one of the organizations abroad. Also the nature of the relationship between national forces inside the country is a reflection of the nature of that relationship between these forces abroad.

Hence we must look at the organizations outside the country with the idea of strengthening relations between the factions and removing from these relations reasons for suspicion so that common programs can be developed to help forces inside the country form a stronger, a more steadfast and a more forward looking

relationship. It is not true at all that organizations inside the country work on their own. The formula of a front, in its extant weak form abroad as represented by the Executive Committee, affects the nature of relations inside the occupied land. These relations need firmly established channels so that we can set up a more stable interaction between [forces] outside the country and those inside the country to avoid having unilateral national action inside the country become the prevailing feature of the struggle. For example, we have been struggling for years to set up an office for the occupied land other than that which was set up by the Executive Committee. That office would undertake in a principal way the functions of the steadfastness process. An office for the occupied land, which is supposed to include representatives of all factions and is to have a political operations room and a military operations room, is meant to undertake the functions of coordination. It is to issue political directives and settle matters regarding alliances inside the occupied land, either in trade union elections or elsewhere. I recall that the Office of the Occupied Land in the Fatah Movement held several meetings recently with the brothers in the PFLP and in the DFLP. We are in the process of completing the meetings with the remaining brothers in the factions of the Resistance in an attempt to attain establishment of this office.

On the subject of alliances the working paper that was presented by you stated that there were bilateral alliances controlled by the interests and the power of the two organizations forming an alliance and that no attention was being paid to the required general alliances. It is true that this does happen sometimes, but it is not the rule. In the recent student council elections at al-Najah University, a Palestinian National Unity ticket was nominated. That ticket reflected those that were being formed outside the occupied land. However, the Palestinian national unity ticket was not successful; it was the religious ticket that won the elections. At Bir Zeit University also one ticket was nominated. At any rate, I believe that the nature of relations inside the occupied land still needs molding and more attention. This can only be achieved by establishing an active office for the occupied land outside the occupied homeland. That office would look into all matters: it would consult with national leaders inside the occupied land; it would, accordingly, make the appropriate decisions that would guarantee the advancement of a Palestinian national action that would be more effective in the face of the Israeli occupation; it would resist Camp David plans; and it would resist the plans of the Jordanian regime which still have some influence inside the occupied land.

The matter of having a single command inside the country is one that sometimes moves forward and sometimes backward. It may be that the highest form of having a single command inside the occupied land was achieved when the Palestinian National Front was established. All national factions and all national forces and activists who were fighting against the occupation in the occupied land were represented in that front. They are the ones who for many years were able to lead the struggles of our people in the occupied homeland in a highly efficient manner, until the enemy was able to reveal [the identity] of this leadership and succeeded in dealing a blow to it. The enemy sent some of these leaders away, put some of them under house arrest and imposed penalties on others. A period of inertia and disputes over the nature of the National front followed that.

The dispute revolved around a fundamental issue: What is the function of the National Front in the occupied land? Is it a substitute for the PLO? Is it the

PLO's arm inside the occupied land? What is the nature of the forces that are represented by this front? Actually, the matter is considerably different. The question is this: Do we form a national front in the occupied land that would be controlled by the issues and the laws of national unity outside the occupied land? In other words, what are the forces that are being represented in the National Front, and how large is each one of them? All this prodded some people to fight the National Front, accusing it of not truly representing the forces in the occupied land. There were other forces trying to suggest that communists were controlling the National Front, and this was used as an excuse to attack the front.

Actually, the national front was representing all the national forces that believe in the programs of the PLO and are striving to achieve them. It was no coincidence that the National Council in its recent session emphasized the importance of rebuilding the National Front. In recent years the National Guidance Committee had been substituted for the National Front. The committee had been formed early in 1978 to face the Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. action that occurred in the aftermath of President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. This committee included mayors and economic and political activists; it was able to attract lay Palestinians and to form subsidiary National Guidance Committees that comprised all the cities and villages of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These committees are still carrying out the daily task of leading the struggle in the occupied land. However, the task of rebuilding the National Front remains an urgent one, and action must be taken to complete efforts in that regard. We are to benefit from the obstacles we faced during our past period of action.

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh: Actually, the question that was posed to us does not deal merely with the problems of daily relations and daily action. In my judgment the question presents a fundamental problem regarding the over-all struggle of the Palestinian National Movement. This problem must be viewed as follows:

People in our Palestinian communities inside or outside the occupied land are living under disparate political and social conditions. This situation developed over a long period of time, ever since the disaster of 1948. Although most of our people live on both banks [of the Jordan River], under occupation or in the diaspora, they are united from a political standpoint on the foundation of the PLO's program and within its framework. This aspect which demonstrates the growing unity of our people and the growing unity of their struggle is countered on the other side by the fact that the conditions and functions of the struggle are different and varied in each Palestinian community. From this premise relations with the forces of organizations that are struggling in the occupied land cannot be approached in the same manner that relations with the Tyre or Sidon organization can be discussed regarding a leadership post in Beirut. The general course is one about which there is unanimous agreement in the context of the PLO. But it is impossible--not only from a practical standpoint, but also because of the conditions and tasks of the continuing struggle against the occupation--for our people in the occupied areas to have a leadership post abroad that would undertake the responsibility of directing the day in day out tactics and detailed actions of this struggle inside the occupied land. It is quite natural that the function of directing the struggle and outlining its tactics would fall on the shoulders of this or the other organization inside the occupied land. This would be its duty and its principal role. From this premise I would like to say that the statement that the organization inside the country works by itself, as though this were an

accusation or a flaw in the national action, is meaningless. When I say the organization "works by itself," I do not mean that the organization is pursuing a general policy that contradicts the policy of the organization abroad. What I mean is that the organization inside the country has the freedom to outline its own tactics and the tasks of its daily struggle within the framework of the general policy that unites the organization and its actions on the Palestinian scene as a whole.

This is the first matter I wanted to mention. The second matter I wanted to mention is that some of the problems facing relations between Palestinian national forces inside the country are topical. Some of these problems should be dealt with with the assistance and participation of the organizations that are outside the country, and with the assistance of the organization's leaders. In other words, a topical problem is one thing--whether it manifests itself in ideological or political differences or in differences between the ratio of powers in one or another location inside the country and the ratio of those same powers abroad--and the struggle that stems from purely personal and narrow considerations is another. The liberation organization and all the Palestinian national forces abroad must join in solidarity to narrow the scope of these differences. I excuse absolutely no one from this responsibility.

There is a third point that I would like to mention. The posture of the Palestinian National Front inside the country used to stem from the same premise to which I alluded. Do we want a national front that would lead and direct the national struggle as a whole in the occupied areas? Do we want this front to take its own circumstances and conditions into consideration? Do we want it to take into account the willingness of the masses, the condition of the enemy, the ratio of current forces and how these forces can be developed? Or do we want a national front that would be a mere tool that carries out instructions it receives from abroad? I believe that the fact that in some Palestinian circles the fear may prevail that the National Front inside the country may become an independent center or one that is opposed to the PLO is unjustifiable and absolutely illegitimate. Quite the contrary, the National Front has representatives from all the forces, and they can be found in the various communities of our Palestinians people as independent, national organizations and figures. After 1973 and throughout the years during which I worked in the National Front on a regular basis, the front constituted a principal force flying the banner of the PLO. It has affirmed that the standard for measuring patriotism in the occupied areas was recognizing the organization as the sole legitimate representative of all the Palestinian people. It was those who were outside the National Front, or at least some of them, who were trying to set up alternative command posts or posts that would compete with the PLO. It is ironical that some people are still careful of maintaining relations with those who were trying to set up alternatives to the PLO on the pretext that in their absence the National Front cannot represent all our various Palestinian communities.

In my judgment the problem is not that this organization is or is not controlling the National Front. When the front did exist, no organization had a numerical majority within the front's leadership. All forces and all tendencies without exception had an opportunity to get these leadership positions, provided that they abide by the program of the National Front which constitutes recognition of the PLO and working under its banner.

The problem then lies in the fact that there are tendencies within Palestinian action which want any unified national action within the occupied areas to serve tactical objectives and not the Palestinian national struggle and its functions in the occupied areas. [These tendencies want Palestinian action] for political considerations which one or another party or this or the other agency abroad thinks [is important]. This does not make the National Front become the command for a popular national movement as much as it turns the front into a group of political agents.

Therefore, I am saying that there was no political problem. The last program presented by the National Front in 1979 affirmed that the front was the arm of the PLO and that it abides by its program. And here two controversies emerged:

The first controversy was attributed to a claim made by some people that the front ought not to be the only arm of the PLO. Instead, the PLO should have several arms in the occupied areas, including those forces and elements who in their daily practical policy do not adhere to the policy of the PLO and its national course. In fact, some of these forces are even working to find an alternative to the PLO.

The second controversy is attributed to another claim that the front should not have its own program which is derived from the PLO's political program. The truth of the matter is that this is quite illogical. The National Front takes the general political objectives outlined by the PLO and its National Council and political program, and it formulates from that its detailed plan for the struggle. It formulates the tasks of that struggle and the forms for mobilizing, organizing and leading the masses against the occupation inside the occupied areas.

What I want to insist on, which is what Brother Majid has concluded, is that it is necessary to rebuild the National Front. In this regard we are not starting from scratch. There are combat relations and forms of cooperation and solidarity that are part of the struggle inside the occupied areas. In my judgment and in spite of struggles or disputes that may appear here or there, these relations are much better than the forms [of cooperation] and relations that are to be found outside the occupied areas. These relations are generally managed in a democratic manner that is better than that which controls relations outside the occupied land.

There is coordination; there is solidarity; and political unity is being carried out in a better way. But the task remains: these relations must be completed and developed so that a Palestinian National Front can be rebuilt so as to include all the active forces that can be found on the scene of the national struggle, provided that these forces adhere basically to the PLO's program and to the program laid down by the National Front. The problem of adhering to the PLO's program is not a problem for the forces who in the past made up the National Front; but it is rather a problem for the forces which, it is being said, were cut off from the National Front in the past.

Abu 'Ali Mustafa: At the outset I want to state for the record my appreciation for [my] brothers in SHU'UN FALASTINIYAH for their action in bringing us together in this symposium to deliberate about one of our most important national subjects, that of the struggles of our people in the probable homeland.

In the questions that are raised in this paper I agree completely with what

Brother Majid said. We cannot effect a mechanical separation between our actions inside the occupied land and our actions abroad. Regardless of what may appear to be political and geographical boundaries between our condition abroad and the condition of our people inside the country, that does not deny the fact that we are suffering from one question and that we are carrying on our shoulders the responsibility for the same confrontation. To prove the association that exists between conditions abroad and conditions inside the country, let me mention two notable examples as landmarks in the modern history of the Palestinian national struggle. These examples will underscore the point which Brother Majid mentioned about the associations in our struggle and the fact that these have both negative and positive effects on the situation inside the country and abroad.

We all recall the standard of effectiveness of the Palestinian Revolution and of our masses inside the occupied land in 1967, 1968, 1969 and until mid 1970. But the major incident that built a barrier in front of this national tide was manifested in the 1970 September massacres and in the effects of those massacres. This was truly a setback that generated a sense of failure and despair in the occupied land.

The other example I am citing is a positive example. This was the battle of March 1978 in south Lebanon. This battle took the form of a violent uprising that comprised all the occupied lands and all the sectors of our people. None of the forces had been able to predict that such an uprising could actually occur with such a throng.

Thus, without overlooking the magnitude of the borders that we see in the material world around us--the demographic world, the geographic world and the political world--[we note that] there is an association between our condition abroad and our condition inside the country. [There is also an association] between the disparity of tasks which stem basically from the same program. This makes us look more carefully into the reason why these legitimate questions are coming up--the questions to which the symposium paper referred. These questions cannot be confined to a symposium such as this; they may be raised within every single organization because they stem from material facts; they do not come out of the blue.

In answering these questions I believe that there is a crucial point that we must deal with not only in this symposium, but also in a common effort so that we can overcome them. The large rift is not inside the country: it is not in our organizations; it is not among our leaders; and it is not in our masses. The rift lies in the overall conditions of the revolution's leaders abroad. It is a rift in the general course, in the method by which national unity is understood. We can become engaged in debates for hours, and we can hold intense bilateral, tri-lateral, quadrilateral and group meetings every day without achieving adequate coordinating formulas. How do we explain this course? How do we explain the fact that 15 years after the June setback we still stand at every meeting of the National Council to talk about subjects of national unity without succeeding in giving them form? Is not the course we are pursuing the reason for this? Is it not the course that is controlling practices on the Palestinian scene and are not these practices having effects and creating problems inside the country that are at variance with what we ourselves approved?

Is there anyone of us who was not quite satisfied with the program that was approved by the 14th Palestinian National Council, especially the organizational part

of that program? We all recorded that day a unified position that stems from the conviction that these broad lines could constitute a proper approach to putting the Palestinian house in order on sound principles. However, at the 15th [session] of the council we went back to complaining, and we did not take an earnest stance to outline a proper course for decisions and relations. It is the absence of this stance that is the essence of the weakness in the matter of national unity.

We understand that national unity must be based on a foundation of common understanding. It must be based on a foundation of political, ideological and organizational independence. On matters where political differences exist, we are not hoping for the achievement of political unity abroad or inside the country. What is important is that matters abroad and inside the country be set on proper foundations that are drawn by the leaders of the PLO, by all its political, military, organizational, financial and administrative formations.

Let us take one example: that of prisoners. From a humanitarian, national aspect, one martyr must not be distinguished from another, and one prisoner must not be distinguished from another. But it was only in mid 1980 that an agreement was reached that our organizations were to adopt all the prisoners of the Palestinian Revolution. The organizations have been suffering from this matter since a prisoner is in the final analysis a fighter for the Palestinian Revolution regardless of his theoretical or political affiliation. This delay in making that decision was painful. Nevertheless, we will not despair, and we will continue to fight to get rid of these reasons for suspicion and negative factors, provided that serious preparations be made for pursuing a more truthful course, manifesting a willingness to translate what we are presenting theoretically on paper into action.

But regarding the subject of national unity and the experiences it went through inside the occupied land, we recall the statement that was issued in August of 1973. It was a progressive program that was approved by the basic activist forces inside the occupied land. However, class gains, as my colleague Yasir mentioned, tend to overpower the general sound course and strike out matters wherever and whenever those classes wish.

I recall that in 1974 when the National Council was convening in Cairo a message with a political aim was received. This is regardless of our agreement or disagreement with the content of that message. The National Council recognized the message, and it was read from the podium of the National Council: the Palestinian National Front was considered the active arm of the PLO in the occupied land. By contrast we are struggling to implement what the 14th Palestinian National Council approved in one of its articles regarding the problem of the National Front. And this organization which was established inside the occupied land to comply with the resolution of the Palestinian National Council itself is ignored, and endless hours are spent debating its identity: is it the arm of the organization, or is it one of the arms of the organization? All this is an effort to outmaneuver this organization and avoid making a decision.

When discussions reach the point of setting conditions that affect the organizational structure of the National Front, such as insisting that controversial figures become leaders of the National Front as a condition for removing restraints on the front, we then would have the right to say that this policy is unacceptable, and this would affect what has been accomplished in this regard.

On the other hand there was a discussion about the extent to which the front represents the majority of Palestinian forces. Some people thought the front did not represent all the forces on the scene of Palestinian action. If this is a legitimate discussion, then it must also include [the plan that] was formulated on the foundation of the Palestinian Revolution's action program which was endorsed by the 14th National Council. It affirms the need to revive the National Front.

As far as formulating a plan of action for the National Front inside the country, according to what Colleague Yasir mentioned, when we devise the general program for the Palestinian Revolution, we must give the National Front inside the country a broader range so it can devise its own detailed program. For example, the congress of the PFLP draws up the general program while the leadership in the occupied land draws up its own program. This does not constitute a departure from the general program of the front, but it is a practical application of the policy for which details are sketched. For all these [reasons] we do not understand the objections that were made about the National Front's plan of action which stated that the plan constituted a departure from that of the Palestinian National Council or a departure from organizational principles. We think that this objection was made for political reasons and sequels which held sway over positions in that regard.

Let us point out a few examples about the extent of the power we can manifest in upgrading the level of our struggle against the Israeli occupation and confronting all the forces that are serving objectives which ultimately serve the interests of the occupation. These forces may be the lackeys of the Jordanian regime and its communities, or they may be religious forces of the right which began to be active in the occupied territories. They are affecting the program of the Palestinian Revolution and thwarting its activities in some locations. These forces carried out sabotage activities that we all know about, especially in the Gaza Strip, for example. [They also sabotaged] missions that were planned in the general plan.

The example of the ticket at al-Najah College is the best manifestation of that. There was an attempt by the forces of the right to take over the entire slate [in the elections] at al-Najah College. When national forces formed a unified ticket, the forces of the right were able to bust that ticket. In the meantime we were finding ourselves faced with opposite ticket busting efforts in other locations due to the fact that national forces had not reached an agreement.

And here I would like to mention one point: it would be beneficial if discussion of that point in the fields of the Palestinian Revolution would continue. If we had set down sound rules regarding the battles that we fight against each other in the field of trade union action and people's associations abroad, we would have overcome such matters inside the occupied land too. The sound rule that I am referring to is that of proportional representation. Because this rule is not applied abroad, we find ourselves inside the country faced with a variety of positions that sometimes affect the strength of national forces. It is this which gives the forces of the right and reactionaries an opportunity to succeed in some Palestinian organizations.

By the way, we greatly appreciate the step that was taken to establish the National Guidance Committee, which was called the Guidance Committee, after the Bayt Hanina Conference and after the Camp David Accords were announced. However,

as a popular front we did not take the National Guidance Committee to be an alternative to the National Front. We rather took it as a broader framework on which the National Front would rely to expand the circle of its defenses against the autonomy project. The National Front must continue to be in a position of leadership; it must continue to mold all the organizations inside the occupied land. Then it is to spread committees of the front at all locations. In other words, it is unacceptable for the National Front to be in the West Bank without having branches in the Gaza Strip, for example, or without having its committees in Nablus, in Jerusalem, in Bethlehem and in all the other areas.

This is the better formula through which we can develop our defenses in the occupied land. We understand that there are objective causes, not only subjective ones, that are impeding the development of the National Front. Among these is the fact that the enemy is engaged in oppressive acts that have gone as far as shedding the blood of the front's symbolic figures, such as Bassam al-Shak'ah and Karim Khalaf. In addition, Muhammad Milhim and Fahd al-Qawasimah have also been expelled to weaken the effectiveness of the National Front.

Going back to the same question with regard to the political struggles among the factions, and especially participation in the National Front, we also understand that there would be a controversy over numerous questions. But we do not understand these controversies having priority over the points of agreement. Let us agree that controls are to be placed on these controversies. Let us agree that these controversies remain secondary and that the principal conflict remain that which we have with the enemy.

Muhammad Khalifah: Actually, I do not feel that there are contradictions in the discussions of our colleagues. There is rather integration along with some dissimilarity in points of view.

I want to comment first on a statement in the working paper. That statement states that what has been happening so far is that it is the masses inside the country, out of their own awareness, who are rallying around the factions of the Resistance. The masses are perceptively rallying around the Resistance as a result of the fact that the factions have organized them and as a result of the fact that the factions are adhering to the political position of the PLO. The masses are being mobilized on that basis. This fact is inconsistent with the conclusion Brother Bilal reached in the working paper.

Regarding action inside the country and action abroad, I believe that the two actions complement each other. Each action has its own circumstances, methods and tools which may either be totally or partially different from the other. The real problem which affects matters inside the country comes as a result of erroneous practices. I stress this. The problem is the result of intervention from abroad and the effect of that intervention [on conditions] inside the country. I have persistently stated at National Council meetings that we decide on many, many questions, but that we do not commit ourselves to carry out our decisions in earnest. Inside the country we can all be found as factions. Within the conditions our people are experiencing in the occupied land and within the required struggles I believe that we can only exist as a united national front that acts in a unified manner. Inside the country there aren't as many gains to be made as there are sacrifices and challenging positions with the enemy. But here we are under

conditions that are much better than theirs. Accordingly, the lack of commitment outside the occupied homeland is unfortunately reflected on the factions inside the country and on their conduct. Sometimes I get to the point of telling all of us, "Let's leave the people inside the country alone. Let them act on their own; they can only act within the framework of the PLO. They will adhere to its resolutions." There is agreement about these resolutions, but there are differences about implementing them. These differences are due to the fact that these factions are not committed, but the people [inside the country] will be. They will all pull together, and they will all work within one framework. This is the basic question from which the problem of [conditions] inside the country must be approached. To what extent do we adhere to and implement the resolutions of our national councils? I am confident that the commitment of people inside the country will be stronger. They are sincere and clear in their commitment to the PLO as the legitimate and only representative [of the people], and [they are equally sincere and clear] in their rejection of autonomy. When a dispute takes place, it takes place here, abroad. Then we send it back inside the country where problems begin.

'Arabi 'Awwad: First, let me repeat my appreciation to the magazine, SHU'UN FALASTINIYAH for holding this symposium about the issues of the Palestinian National Struggle on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. In recent years this struggle has been playing a significant role in reinforcing the Palestinian Revolution and the PLO in general. The struggle in the occupied land against the occupation, against various conspiracies and against the cause of the Palestinian people has been escalated.

The occurrence of this phenomenon, the discrepancy between [conditions] inside the country and [conditions] abroad, is normal since our public there is faced with the occupation's plots to Judaize [the country], plunder the land and carry out oppressive measures as well as political plans whose purpose is to liquidate the Palestinian national question. It is not a coincidence that the National Movement there is undertaking initiatives in that struggle. For example, it was the national forces inside the country that established the National Front in the occupied land to oppose the occupation's plans to set up an alternative leadership to the PLO and take advantage of the September massacres and also to oppose the attempts of the regime in Jordan after the united kingdom proposal was made. The National Front was established to include all the forces that are harnessing the energies of our people to oppose the conspiracy of the civilian administration. The occupation launched a project to form a political movement that would become a tool for carrying out the civilian administration project and confronting the activity of the government in Jordan to establish a united kingdom. After that the 11th Palestinian National Council which was held in January 1973 adopted a resolution forming a united national front on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Thanks to the efforts that were made, the National Front was formed, and it announced its program in mid August 1973.

I want to add another example. This is the action that was taken in opposition to Camp David and autonomy to form the National Guidance Committee which emerged in the midst of the struggles against Camp David and against the administrative autonomy project. The committee came out of numerous conferences, one of which was that which was held in Bayt Hanina. Besides, there were popular conferences in Bethlehem, Nablus, Bit Zeit and Gaza. This committee represented broad, popular forces and organizations. The task of pursuing the struggle against Camp David and the administrative autonomy was determined for it.

There are many other examples. Among them is that of the municipal elections which were held in 1976 when the masses and the national forces realized that the occupation was engaged in an attempt to take advantage of the elections and to create an alternative leadership to the PLO. It was taking advantage of the war that had broken out in Lebanon against the Palestinian Revolution. Here too the national forces realized that the correct way to confront this conspiracy was to take part in the elections and to turn them into a national battle against the civilian administration that was then being proposed by Shimon Perez. The Palestinian National Front defined its position on the basis of its realization that participating in the elections as a means for foiling the occupation's conspiracy was important. And this is what happened. It's been proven that this action was correct because the elections yielded municipal councils that were mostly under the banner of the PLO. These municipal councils became sites for the Palestinian national struggle. Evidence for this lies in the vicious campaigns that were launched against them. The conspiracy to assassinate the three mayors, Bassam al-Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf and Ibrahim al-Tawil was no coincidence. Nor was the removal of Fahd al-Qawasimah and Muhammad Milhim a coincidence.

The forms of struggle that were outlined and executed inside the country were done with the initiative of the national forces, the National Front and the National Guidance Committee. They were the ones who organized the strikes and oversaw them daily; the Zionist authorities and agencies of the media themselves admit that. They were the ones who made the decision for the collective resignation from the municipal councils to counter the decision to remove Bassam al-Shak'ah. At the same time there was some confusion and lack of clarity that was almost reflected on the occupied land, had the situation not been brought under control at the last moment when the leadership of the PLO assumed a posture in support of the resignations of the municipal councils. Consequently, there was the collective resignation which forced occupation authorities to revoke their decision to remove Bassam al-Shak'ah and to restore him to his position as mayor of Nablus.

I want to affirm here that despite our satisfaction with the existing ties and unity between the struggle of our Palestinian people in their various positions, there are in that position, as [my] Colleague Yasir mentioned, special conditions that require forms of organization and struggle which are appropriate to the existing situation. Actually, our public and our movement devised various forms of struggle. They have also achieved an advanced level of organization in the area of popular organizations, clubs or societies. Even in the area of volunteer labor committees we now have 75 committees on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. This is one organizational form that brings young people together. Therefore, the existence of initiatives inside the country is not a negative phenomenon. It is rather a positive matter that is not inconsistent with the unity of the Palestinian struggle. Quite the contrary it affirms, reinforces and enriches that struggle.

As far as the forms of the front are concerned, the Palestinian National Front actually emerged and presented a clear plan against the occupation and its projects to eliminate the Palestinians. It affirmed the unity of the Palestinian people and confirmed the fact that it was an inseparable part of the PLO. This is stipulated in its plan which was declared in mid August of 1973.

And the front actually began directing the struggle; this became evident in 1974, in 1975 and in 1976.

However, there was regression in the activity of the National Front. What was the reason for it? Was this caused by the existence of a communist controlled front, as is being said? Facts say otherwise.

The reason lies in the emergence of a faction that opposed the general course of the Palestinian struggle; that trend was inclined to establish ties with rightist and reactionary Arab countries.

The National Front was cautioning against this trend in its activities, and it exposed it. Therefore, pressure was applied to weaken it. After Camp David the danger of liquidation projects became evident to everyone. Therefore, the front stood up again and proclaimed a plan, but this plan was opposed not because of the magnitude of the representation of this or the other organization, but rather because of the plan itself. The plan was opposed specifically because of the article that called for breaking all forms of dialogue with U.S. imperialism. This is the real reason [for the opposition], and what actually happened was that the National Front as well as the National Guidance Committee adhered to this faction and boycotted the tours of both U.S. envoys.

There are forces on the occupied land whose posture in the face of occupation and occupation projects is a wavering one. It was these forces that carried out the contacts, and it was this fact that gave rise to the discussion that the National Front was not the only arm or the only representative of the PLO inside the country and that there were rather other forces on the scene. The reference was to these forces in particular. This quite frankly is a serious problem because despite their verbal proclamation that they are with the PLO, these forces are actually striving to find an alternative to the PLO which would be willing to deal with the plans that are being proposed by U.S. imperialism. These forces also have ties with the government in Jordan. In addition, they did not sever their ties with the occupation itself. They've bargained with the occupation and were engaged in truce negotiations with it.

Thus, the way to strengthen and stimulate the National Front and the National Guidance Committee lies basically in adopting a firm, unequivocal political posture vis a vis the plans that are being made now against our people. These plans are manifested in the autonomy [proposal] or the so-called Jordanian option. As far as existing disputes are concerned, in my judgment, they are actually minor in nature.

I would like to conclude [my comments] on the aforementioned question by talking about the dangers of the absence of a unified command inside the country. This problem must be clear. Our people and their national forces in the occupied land have a very high level of political sensitivity and awareness. They've rejected and resisted all the plans of the occupation, from the very first day when the proposed Palestinian entity project under occupation was proposed in June 1967. We must refer here to the role that was played by the defensive action of our people and their organized forces in the National Front and in the National Guidance Committee. They blocked the autonomy conspiracy whose threat is still present. Therefore, as far as the destiny or the posture of our people and their national leaders in the occupied land is concerned, there is no reason for fear in this regard.

Bilal al-Hasan: In light of the comments that have been made, permit me to make a

few observations that would expand [the scope of] the discussion and allude to some of the opinions that are being expressed on the Palestinian scene which may have not yet been expressed at this meeting. There is no doubt that the National Front inside the country was a major step forward. I have felt its effect on the Palestinian scene, in the Arab world and throughout the world. But the question must be focused on the age of the Palestinian Revolution and its relationship with the front. Our revolution is 16 years old, but the National Front is still a front that is based on a political position only. It has not succeeded in developing its action so as to devise organizational or executive guidelines [for action]. Palestinian leaders should look into this point: How can we develop the actions of the front so that they would go beyond agreement on a political course to agreement on interim or daily action programs?

The second point was mentioned by Brother Yasir. He said there was nothing wrong with the organizations having their own separate plans as long as the general political trend adhered to the political course. This is true, but why should agreement be confined to agreement on a political plan? Why are we unable to agree on any detailed plan that would affect the total defenses on the West Bank? We conclude from this point that it is normal for every organization to show more concern for the future of its fighters than for the future of fighters of other organizations because each organization knows its fighters personally and knows their families and their responsibilities. This is normal. But what about the Palestinian citizen who is fighting outside the framework of the organizations? This is a very common case in the occupied land: there are children who throw stones at the occupation soldiers; there are people whose homes have been blown up; and there are people who quite accidentally gave refuge to a guerilla and had their homes blown up or were expelled from the area where they lived. People like that do not belong to any particular organization. Who will look after them? It is the command which has daily tasks and daily plans that is supposed to take care of them, but this is not happening yet.

There is another problem which has to do with the status of the West Bank, [an area whose status] requires a mix of open and clandestine fighting. So far, the National Front and all the organizations that grew out of it have undertaken [a course of] open fighting.

As far as I know, however, there is no front and there are no undercover representatives of this front to keep up the requirements of the clandestine fight inside the country. What I want to refer to in these observations is the fact that the political agreement in the front is good. However, there are developments for an agreement in the front that we were not involved in inside the country or abroad, even though representatives of this agreement are supposed to undertake solving such problems.

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh: Let me explain what I said. I was talking about relations between [organizations] inside the country and abroad from the perspective of taking into consideration the forms of diversity and dissimilarity.

Regarding the observations that were made, it is evident that the Palestinian Revolution is playing a principal role outside the occupied homeland to support the national struggle inside the homeland. On the basis of the common tasks of all the national forces inside the occupied land, relations with the national forces outside the occupied homeland may be organized.

Let me cite a remarkable example here. A committee was formed outside the country a few years ago. It included representatives of the various national forces that were fighting inside the occupied land. The function of that committee was to back the struggle inside the occupied land, not by having each organization restrict its support to its branch inside the country, but rather by dealing with common missions that concern the various national forces fighting inside the country. This includes backing the popular institutions and organizations and the municipalities, which constitute a unifying framework, and supporting them in a variety of ways; it includes backing the struggle of the masses, especially the detainees and prisoners; it includes confronting Israeli oppression [manifested in the imposition of] fines, the destruction of homes, etc.; and it includes the political propaganda war to conduct Arab or universal solidarity campaigns with the struggle that is going on in the occupied areas. These are all joint tasks which if carried out effectively, would provide the required effective support and backing for the unified national struggle in the occupied areas.

It is regrettable that this committee which worked for a limited period in the context of the PLO has undergone attempts for its destruction. This was attempted under the pretext that there were frequent disagreements in this committee and that this committee cannot come to an agreement. It is better that we have disagreements in the committee than outside the committee. In my judgment this is a narrow partisan premise; it is not a premise which one can use to deal with the national struggle, with its institutions, with its joint and unified organizations inside the occupied areas or with its unified institutions and organizations outside the occupied areas. This question was emphasized by the latest Palestinian National Council. It is a question that still needs an effort from all of us so that it can be confirmed in practical terms. This is the first point.

The second point is that despite the emergence of secondary disputes here or there, relations between the national forces inside the occupied areas are superior to those outside the occupied areas. I am reaffirming this for a simple reason that goes back basically to the mood of the mass movement which is applying pressure and influencing [conditions]. This movement has, on the one hand, totally isolated anyone who wanted to depart from the Palestinian national consensus in all stages of the struggle under occupation. On the other hand, it continued to concentrate with its sound insights on what is primary and to avoid what was secondary. Even those elements that we may call representatives of the national bourgeoisie inside the occupied areas were firmer and bolder regarding their willingness to struggle and maintain their political positions. They were more influenced by the mood of the people's movement than their counterparts outside the occupied areas. All these factors constitute the principal guarantee, or they did in the past constitute the principal guarantee, for our struggle inside the occupied areas.

We are most certainly not living under ideal conditions. When we talk about a national front--and here I am affirming what Brother Abu 'Ali said--we do not consider the National Guidance Committee to be an alternative to the front or its antithesis. However, the National Front is not merely a higher body for political coordination. This is not our understanding of it. The National Front is supposed to include representatives from the broad infrastructure of the various national groups and forces. Political representation in its leadership must be the final result of that situation.

The response to that among the ranks of the Palestinian people has been very broad. Examples of the conflicts we see abroad do not exist in the same way or on the same level inside the country. However, the problem--or the obstacle--which is still blocking this road is the political position. That is still delaying the reconstruction and revival of the front in the occupied areas despite the fact that there have been numerous attempts to establish forms of national coordination on various levels. The National Guidance Committee, for example, was not only a high-placed central committee; it formed branch committees for national guidance in the cities and in some of the camps in the occupied areas. It could have been possible, and it still is, for this operation to continue and to expand further, for there is a willingness, both from an objective and a subjective standpoint inside the occupied areas to develop guidelines for national relations in the context of the front or of the Guidance Committee. However, the problem actually lies in the obstacles that come from abroad. I am not denying that there are obstacles and problems that stem from inside the country, but these are not fundamental.

This does not at all mean that we start from scratch. There are unified national institutions inside the occupied areas. There are efforts to form unified committees to defend detainees inside the occupied areas, for example. These committees would include representatives of the various national forces. There are efforts to form organizations and institutions inside the occupied areas to deal, for example, with single issue questions: the method of confronting settlement; the destruction of homes; wholesale arrests; or others. But what remains is that if we want to go forward in this direction which we discussed, we are being called upon to turn a political resolution which is issued by the National Council into a practical fact. This is regarding the formation of the Palestinian National Front, adopting it as the arm of the PLO and as the national command for the struggle inside the occupied areas. There is no conflict between these two matters. The other matter is that we are to play our role abroad; we have not been doing that fully. Bilateral coordination efforts with the brothers in Fatah, in the Popular Front, in the communist organization, in al-Sa'iqah or in the various factions are no substitute for a common framework to deal with and to solve the common problems of the unified national struggle in the occupied areas.

2. National Unity

Bilal al-Hasan: The general prevailing feeling is that national unity inside the country--and particularly between the factions--is weaker now than it was in 1973, 1974 and 1975. We believe there are two reasons for this:

First, some factions have not understood the general mood of the public. They looked at their organizational power and considered that a measure for determining their power among the masses. When the National Front was formed inside the country, communists played a prominent role. But the communists were hasty, and they began talking about having complete control of the front. This forced some organizations and some popular leaders to try to prove otherwise, and this affected the strength of the internal alliances.

Second, some organizations have their own ambitions and work at a fast pace. This sometimes leads to early struggles. If patience were available within the revolution, such disputes could be overcome by dialogue.

The question is this: What are the prospects and the means for improving national unity between the factions inside the country?

Majid Abu Sharar: I almost feel [from the tone of] our discussion of the National Front inside the occupied land that the National Front has become the target [of our efforts] and not the means whereby the purpose of escalating the struggle can be served.

The National Front is the product of the political and military awakening that took place in the Palestinian struggle in the period between 1973 and 1976. That period witnessed an extremely important process of political and military awakening inside and outside the occupied land.

It was during that period that the uprising which began in 1974 and continued for a while occurred. During that period also, after 1974, Palestinian political action broke into the world scene in an intense manner. Then there was the 2-years' war in Lebanon, in 1975 and 1976. It gave the struggle inside the occupied land the basic responsibility of complementing the beleaguered struggle whose defeat was being required outside the occupied homeland.

Hence, the National Front came to lead the struggle at this stage in a practical and actual way. Thus, it is the product of the situation or the product of the firm unity in the Palestinian position at this stage, especially in 1975 and 1976. It was to confront the danger, to withstand it and then to get out of the cycle of danger.

All this provided considerable support to the struggle inside the occupied land. There is no doubt that what followed in the period between 1977 and 1979--which we consider a period of retrogression--was reflected in a crippling way on the situation inside the occupied land. It is known that the Riyadh Conference which was held in 1976--this is the conference that ended the civil war in Lebanon--imposed on the Lebanese scene several setbacks from which it is still suffering. This has had negative effects on the situation inside the occupied land in both the area of military action and in the area of the relationship within the framework of national unity. We must not forget that 1978 was a year of extremely serious Palestinian fighting here in Lebanon. This [too] had considerable effects on the situation inside the occupied land.

This period was followed by that of al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem [which was followed by] Camp David when the need for the presence of a daily command for the Palestinian national struggle inside the occupied land emerged. For several reasons it was difficult to go back to the framework of the National Front. Most importantly it was difficult to go back to the front because it had assumed a progressive aspect. There developed in the Arab world principal forces with branches extending into the Palestinian scene which assumed an unequivocal and a serious position against the National Front.

Then there were some practices which ascribed to this front more than what should have been ascribed to it. As mentioned in the working paper, there were attempts either by some brothers in the Jordanian Communist party or by the brothers on the Palestinian scene to portray the front as a front that was controlled by communists. This gave the forces that are opposed to the front ammunition to

oppose it and fight against it. Besides, we cannot disregard the poor and negative effect of the fact that the Israeli enemy uncovered the leadership of the National Front and the Israeli military governor summoned all the leaders of the front and warned them to stop their activities.

This is on the one hand; on the other hand, the question remains: How do we rebuild the National Front? How do we rebuild its program or its organizational structures? I believe that the process of rebuilding the National Front inside the occupied land, despite the resolution of the recent session of the Palestinian National Council affirming the importance of rebuilding it, is still facing serious obstacles for the following reasons:

First, the presence of the National Guidance Committee, which now has a large number of subordinate local committees throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is true that none of us here wants the National Guidance Committee to become an alternative to the National Front, but in reality it is an alternative to the National Front and it will continue to be that for a period of time. The length of that period will depend on our success on the Palestinian scene in abandoning the cycle of hesitation in the Palestinian political situation and adopting a stance that is more serious. This will most certainly be reflected on the matter of rebuilding the National Front inside the occupied land.

Second, there must be some framework--and it may not be the Executive Committee--that can make a decision to form this National Front. It may be that the best framework for that is the narrower one of the Palestinian leaders, the secretary generals. This is because it is not easy for Palestinian leaders to make a decision regarding the establishment of a national front inside the country whose leaders would be discovered in 1 or 2 weeks. Palestinian leaders, and specifically secretary generals, must reorganize the new national front to ensure secrecy and to ensure earnestness as well.

Third, forces that have greater clout in the occupied land must be more convinced than others of the feasibility of restoring the National Front inside the occupied homeland. Accordingly, they must be prepared to stand by many present actions that took place within the new avenues that developed in the absence of the National Front. These forces must go back once again and work within the framework of the National Front in the occupied land.

If we ignore these points, I believe that we will fall into the trap of rebuilding a new framework that will not last long and will not carry out [any] serious activities.

Regarding the matter of the program and frameworks of this National Front, which would be based on the fact that the National Front is the arm of the PLO inside the occupied land and the daily commander of the struggles of our people and our masses, there is no doubt that the National Front has an indisputable right to generate its own daily combat tactics and devise plans to deal with local issues that have to do with managing the process of the daily struggle on the basis of adhering to the programs of the PLO. This will ultimately lead us to benefit from the experience of the National Guidance Committee which in a short period was able to create more than 40 subordinate organizations. The National Front must create its own organizations, even though these in my opinion do exist. These are the

trade unions and associations and the organizational structures of the political forces inside the occupied land. If these were to join the ranks of the front, these organizations, associations and trade unions will become an organizational tool for the National Front which would be capable of continuing to lead the struggle.

Hence I am repeating that we are not to believe that we are on the verge of reorganizing the National Front. There are real difficulties still impeding that reorganization. A serious fight is inevitable, and serious pressures must be applied to create the circumstances that would be conducive to reorganizing the front.

Discussing the problem of national unity inside the country may be extremely important because such a discussion constitutes one of the steps that must precede the process of rebuilding the National Front. This is because the front is a product [of the material world] and not a national organization that transcends reality. The National Front reflects that material world. Real serious difficulties still exist, as my brother Abu 'Ali Mustafa said, despite the resolutions of the 14th session of the National Council. It may be that the troubles we experienced in the recent session of the Palestinian National Council over the question of national unity are a true reflection of the prevailing relationship on the Palestinian scene.

It is true that the Executive Committee is an organization that brings people together and [it is true] that popular associations and unions are other organizations that bring people together, but there are still basic organizations that divide people and do not bring them together: the media, the political organizations and the military organizations. None of these is unified. Consequently, we are not to rest easy on the notion of Palestinian national unity.

If we are unable to achieve the required measure of national unity despite the fact that 15 years have elapsed in the common struggle, how then can we ask for the formation of a national front inside the occupied land, a national front that can direct the daily struggles, determine tactics and draw up plans for the struggle inside the occupied homeland? The basic problem lies here with us. Despite our concern with favoring [organizations] inside the country; despite our concern that [organizations] inside the country discover their own daily means of struggle; despite our concern that our negative actions have minimal effect on [conditions inside the country], the basis remains here. When we build here a sound national unity, which does not exist; when we create our sound organizational structures, which do not exist now; when we unify our military forces, which are not yet unified; when we streamline our information, which is not yet streamlined; and when we streamline the process of national guidance, which is not streamlined now, we can then say that the effect of that will be the creation of a real national front inside the occupied land. It will enable our people to take serious and real strides forward in their struggle.

Bilal al-Hasan: Permit me to make two observations. I want to refer to a common Palestinian opinion which states, contrary to the opinion of Brother Majid, that the communists on the West Bank played a principal role in promoting the notion that they were the ones in control of the front. They did so with several statements they made and positions they assumed. It was these statements that provoked

the reactions which for some forces and for some organizations required the statement that organization of the front had to be reconsidered since the front would constitute the natural expression of the reality of guerilla action on the West Bank and in the occupied areas. This opinion does exist; let's discuss it because it is common in numerous circles.

The second observation deals with the action tactics of the front. It is true that the front represents the plan about which numerous factions have a minimum agreement, but as Brother Majid indicated, there are strong reactionary Arab influences in the circles of the West Bank and in the circles of the occupied areas. Some of these go back to Jordan, and some of them go back to the Egyptian regime by virtue of the historical relationship [between them].

Some Palestinian forces in the front are favorably disposed to the front's tactics and what has been agreed to only. Other Palestinian forces say, "This is true, but we must add another tactic to neutralize anyone who does not join us in our popular action. From now on if we can neutralize any of the followers of the Jordanian regime, we will have made a gain. If we can neutralize the position of any one from some of the rightist forces who does not approve of the PLO program and who does not approve of the presence of leftist forces in the National Front, we will have made a gain." This tactic was rejected by principal factions in the National Front, and that rejection led to the emergence of some controversy.

Abu 'Ali Mustafa: I believe that with regard to justifying the position on the National Front, talking about "communist control [of the front]" is an oversimplification of the problem wherein lies the truth about the controversy over the subjects of the National Front. The damage lies in the head and not in the arms or extremities, etc. The damage happens in the upper echelons and accordingly affects the lower echelons. Therefore, the fact of the matter is that the subject is not that of "communist control," even though our colleagues in the Palestinian communist organization were satisfied for a period of time with the rhetoric which regarded them as the backbone of the Palestinian National Front. Written and verbal statements were made about them to support that notion, but this is not the truth of the matter regarding the National Front.

There is another problem that has to do with the matter of organizing the National Front. We will not now go into a discussion of [the incidents] that accompanied the declaration that established the front, but we want to emphasize that the organization of the front manifested the reality of the balance of powers inside the occupied lands. However, some people were not satisfied by this. There is no doubt that a serious stance is required. But rifts tainted the recent proclamation about the National Front and the discussion of its program, despite the fact that the 1976 program--like the 1979 program--is quite consistent with all the discussions that have been taking place within the Palestinian organizations. There is, of course, an article in the plan that was presented in 1979 which was clearer in the plan that was drawn up for inside the country than that which was issued in that regard in the National Council: the problem of relations with the Jordanian regime. The plan was clearer in defining how this relationship was to be managed, whereas the 14th National Council had issued a resolution regulating this relationship on certain principles. But regarding the problem of neutralizing some forces, I have not heard by the way that there was one Palestinian organization that assumed a position opposing the possibility of taking advantage of the wavering of

some political or social forces or even of individuals who wish to become affiliated with the national position, even if they were to do so as hangers on against the call for autonomy.

I know from the national conferences that took place in different areas and that culminated in the Bayt Hanina conference, that numerous supporters of the Jordanian regime were participating [in those conferences] on the basis of the position against the call for autonomy. There were no intractable positions, and no one rejected their participation, despite our prior assessment and precautions on the nature of their political inclinations and our warnings that they could use these entities or organizations in the interests of the Jordanian regime. In all the secret discussions that were going on on the Palestinian scene with the parties of the National Front I did not hear of one position advocating inflexibility. Quite the contrary everyone was promoting the notion of bringing together all those who can possibly agree on the required position. In practical terms what neutralized the aforementioned elements, or what neutralized some of them, was the pressure of the mass movement inside the country. It was not any political concession that was offered to them from abroad.

Bilal al-Hasan: What then is the way out regarding the required agreement around the subject of the National Front?

Muhammad Khalifah: Brother Majid proposed a road to agreement through the secretary generals who, in my opinion, are the reason for the complications because they are not of one mind regarding the National Front. Some of them say the National Front is the arm of the PLO, while others say the National Front is not the only arm of the PLO. Therefore, the starting point for settling the controversy around this matter is [to be] in the Executive Committee of the PLO where one conviction would be achieved with all factions or an appeal would be made for all to keep their hands off actions taken inside the country. Everyone would be told, "Organize yourselves into one front; define its frameworks and the method of its actions. Then ask for the support that you need, and we are prepared to meet your request." I am directing a question to Brother Majid: From your experience with this matter, to what extent can all the factions be persuaded to abide by a unified position on the question of the National Front inside the country?

Majid Abu Sharar: It is true that the Executive Committee makes recommendations, not decisions. But regarding questions of special importance which require a consensus, I proposed the subject of secretary generals because we failed in our recent National Council [meeting] to represent all the factions in the PLO Executive Committee.

'Arabi 'Awwad: It is evident that we are all in agreement about the importance of the National Front and its role in the occupied land. This is firmly established in National Council resolutions. But actually there are obstacles impeding the activity of the front and impeding national activity in general. Chief among these obstacles is the policy of oppression which is practiced by the occupation against any activity and any national organization, especially if it is a secret one. But I would like to present another problem: is there a conflict between the National Front and the National Guidance Committee, or is one an alternative to the other? It was actually experience that gave us the answer. As has been mentioned, the National Guidance Committee was formed in a wave of opposition to Camp David. It

imposed its public character from the outset, and it established its branches throughout the occupied land despite the fact that all prohibition measures against it were still in effect. But the National Guidance Committee came into existence in 1978, and the activity of the National Front was restored in 1979. This means that in this climate, the climate of opposing the Camp David conspiracy, it was evident that besides the National Guidance Committee the National Front was necessary. But the occupation opposed the National Front, and this is a significant obstacle that must be overcome. We must achieve flexible formulas that would preserve the National Front so as not to enable occupation authorities to deal blows to it. The question of the political course and manpower and what is being said about the communists' major role is a problem about which I would like to say the following:

First, I want to indicate that there are in fact communists. This is not a secret to anyone. There have been communists on the Palestinian scene for scores of years. But there is actually [another] matter. During the past 14 years there have been changes in the social structure in the occupied land; these changes strengthened the role of the working class and their political expressions and gave the entire movement a progressive character, and that dealt a painful blow to the influence of large landlords. They were the ones who conjured the specter of communism. They were joined in this by reactionary and imperialist forces in the area. I wish to remind you that after the 1976 municipal elections the BBC claimed that communists had obtained 75 percent of the seats. That is, it was the reactionary and imperialist forces themselves that were trying to conjure the specter of communism to go along with the imperialist plan which claimed that the principal task now was that of confronting the Soviets and the communist threat. However, there is one phenomenon that ought to be clear. This phenomenon states that there is a progressive course on the Palestinian scene.

There is another important aspect of the problem that must be referred to in talking about national unity inside the country and about relations between [conditions] inside the country and abroad. This is the need to have the clout of the forces fighting in the occupied land affect the PLO so that unity between those who are inside the country and those who are outside can materialize. Quite candidly I am saying, "Although there is discussion about magnifying the role of the communists, there is an attempt to keep them out of the picture altogether as though they were a non-existent force in the Palestinian struggle. In my judgment this hurts national unity in general, and it hurts the struggle in the occupied land in particular.

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh: I have another point that has to do with national unity inside the country. Actually, the problem regarding national unity and developing national unity inside the country does not lie in the fact that one party is controlling [matters] while other parties want to magnify their clout and their role. The problem in my judgment lies in the fact that there is a forcible attempt to prevent the objective changes that occurred inside the occupied areas, as Brother 'Awwad mentioned, from affecting the political structure of the National Movement and the National Front inside the country. There was a change in the nature of the social makeup of our Palestinian people inside the occupied areas. This change is due to material reasons, chief among which are Israeli colonial policy, the economic merger and the usurpation of the land. The change led to the fragmentation of the traditional structure of Palestinian society inside the country.

That structure was reorganized, not by the will of the occupation, but rather against its will. Although the occupation adopted a policy of colonizing the occupied areas, it would occasionally make an effort in a variety of ways to keep the balance of traditional forces and even to expand their influence. Most recently we saw attempts to establish the so-called league of villages in a number of areas in the occupied land. However, the material change that is taking place remains stronger than all the attempts and maneuvers that are being carried out either by the occupation or by Arab reactionaries. This led to the fact that the working class has turned into a majority class in the ranks of the Palestinian people. Palestinian workers now make up almost 60 percent of the total population engaged in economic activity. This has led to the fact that large groups of young people and educated farmers have joined the ranks of the Palestinian working class and the ranks of the struggle against the occupation itself. Furthermore, the role of Palestinian national and progressive forces in the occupied areas also contributed to raising the standard of awareness and organization of this class. The working class assumed a leadership role in leading the national struggle in the occupied areas.

This is a fact that some Palestinian national forces ought to consider objectively and not to resist. They are not to make up their own obstacles and trumped up excuses in front of it. This matter also became evident from the fact that Palestinian masses in the occupied areas were leaning toward organized activity. The popular movement gradually began giving up improvised methods of struggle and devoted itself to the establishment of trade unions, popular organizations, institutions, associations and clubs.

This development must be pushed to its utmost limits. This is the role through which Palestinian national forces can actually make a contribution to the development of our people's national unity--with all their national groups--inside the country; this is how they can confront the occupation with a united front.

This is no arbitrary or coincidental matter. Reactionaries [in general], who historically have been the foundation of colonialism or of cooperation with Zionism, and Jordanian reactionaries [in particular] began losing their influence almost completely among the ranks of our Palestinian people and within their organizations. Those who would go against the tide of history soon realize their efforts are short lived. They are the ones who are ignoring this change that has taken place in the occupied areas. They are ignoring the fact that, besides the other tasks of the struggle, the task of organizing the popular movement in the occupied areas and expanding its organized frameworks is the principal task in the present situation. It is this that is impeding the establishment of national unity on sound foundations within this framework. We certainly support the participation of the various forces that are contributing effectively to this struggle, including the communist organization, not only inside the country, but also in the organizations of the PLO abroad.

The principal problem is not confined to propensities for exaggerating the role of this or the other organization. Such propensities may have emerged in a statement here or another there; or they may have emerged in an election campaign in one of the unions or organizations inside the occupied areas. This is true. But the essence of the problem once again is that of not seeing the changes that took place and refusing to acknowledge them.

3. Relations with the Jordanian Regime

Bilal al-Hasan: What concerns us in this matter is the fact that the controversies over this matter affect the condition of the struggle in the occupied areas. We notice here [the following]:

First, some organizations that agree with the principle of dialogue and only reject the style and the tactics in which this dialogue is being conducted, do not carry their discussions to the end. The case is presented, and demands are presented as though there were only one Palestinian negotiating party, and the proposals of the Jordanian regime are largely ignored.

As a result the campaign against the dialogue continued even after the dialogue stopped. This suggested that the campaign was being called for its own sake.

Second, we also notice that there was a major difference between the language that was used in the campaign against the dialogue before the National Council met in session and the language that was used during the session of the National Council. The language in the council changed completely, and it was possible because of this change to come out with a collective resolution around the principles for continuing this dialogue. What then was the reason for this accusatory campaign?

In light of this fact, what do you think will be the effects of the continued dialogue with Jordan about the situation in the occupied areas?

I would like to say by way of explaining the written question that is in front of you that before the most recent 15th National Council was convened, a series of interviews was published and some resistance newspapers published a number of articles; all of these revolved around Palestinian-Jordanian relations. When we read the interviews and the articles in the sharp tone in which they were written, we expected the National Council to witness a political massacre concerning this matter. But what happened was the opposite. Instead of heated discussions, we heard calm discussions during which people held on to the same ideas they had against the dialogue with the Jordanian regime, but they did so in a friendly style that ultimately permitted the adoption of a semi-unanimous resolution about how this matter should be dealt with and about the conditions for continuing or suspending the dialogue. On that basis the subject of propaganda campaigns which we exchange was presented, and their effect on our relations with our citizens inside the country, on relations the members of our organizations inside the country have with each other and on our relations with the mayors [was discussed]. I feel that there is something wrong with the way we present issues and that that has a negative effect on our people inside the country.

Abu 'Ali Mustafa: I think that the question we have in front of us now is one thing and what Brother Bilal is proposing now is another.

Bilal al-Hasan: No. The same question is being brought up for discussion, but I added an explanatory remark about it.

Majid Abu Sharar: There is no doubt that Palestinian-Jordanian relations after the outbreak of the Palestinian Revolution took the form of a sharp conflict. So far the Jordanian regime is the only Arab regime that hopes to overthrow the PLO as

the representative of the Palestinian people or at least share that representation with the PLO.

Yes, it is the Jordanian regime that is hoping to overthrow the PLO from its position of representing the Palestinian people, or it is hoping to share that position with it. The Jordanian regime is the regime that is seriously obstructing the escalation of the struggle inside the occupied land. The Jordanian regime is not the only regime pursuing that course, but it is the most effective one. The Jordanian regime is also the only Arab regime that still has political bases inside the occupied land. The Jordanian regime can activate and direct these bases at every stage of the struggle according to its political interests. Thus, we are looking at an unrestricted relationship with the Jordanian regime as a tactical relationship. For us, the Palestinians, the objective of that relationship should be that of managing the process of struggle in our interests. We must not doubt for one moment that the Jordanian regime has any other understanding of this relationship.

Regarding the dialogue with the Jordanian regime, there is no doubt that the return of the Palestinian Resistance to its bases and its capabilities on the East Bank of the Jordan River is an objective of the struggle. [There is also no doubt] that we must really struggle every day to achieve that objective. Dialogue may be one of the methods of that struggle. It is on that basis that the 14th session of the National Council decided to start talks with Jordan within guidelines determined by the council at that time. Only the brothers in the PFLP had reservations about that resolution.

During the period between the 14th and 15th session of the National Council a dialogue took place with chief members of the Jordanian regime, and I believe my brother Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh took part in some of these talks. During these talks the Jordanian regime refused to accept any form of relaxing the restrictions on the PLO so it can reinforce its defensive capabilities toward the occupied land. During those talks the Jordanian party also refused to give the Palestinian party the right to discuss in any respect Palestinians who were living on the east bank of the Jordan River. The Jordanian party considered the people living there Jordanian citizens. Even when the subject of people who were being held in Jordanian prisons came up for discussion, the response was that those people were Jordanians and that Jordanian law applied to them. There is no doubt that the ultimate objective of this course is to weaken the PLO's positions inside the occupied land. This is logical and quite consistent with Jordanian strategy which is seeking, on the whole, to deal a blow to the PLO's role as representative of the Palestinian people and, if possible, to restore its control over the Palestinian people on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

We can say that at the recent meeting of the National Council we did not give the Executive Committee the power we had given it at the 14th session. The recent meeting of our National Council held the Jordanian party responsible for the failure of the dialogue. The council also promised that it would offer Jordanian national forces support in their struggle to prevent the regime from joining the settlement deal and [the course of] Camp David. Besides, the National Council gave the Executive Committee freedom to use all the methods of struggle to guarantee that the Palestinian Revolution gains easy access to the East Bank of the Jordan River. Nevertheless, we must not make the mistake of believing for one moment that

this regime can be sincere in giving the PLO easy access on account of the fact that it is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This is because the Jordanian regime's ultimate objective is to take over the Palestinian political position and, consequently, control the liberation organization and scuttle its role. And here I still recall a delegation which I was a member of in 1973 during the October war. The delegation had gone to Jordan to ask the Jordanian government to grant 100 guerillas entry into the West Bank. We spent 5 hours with Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i then, and we were not allowed to have one guerilla go through. Jordan turned down our request while the Arab world was fighting Israel. How can Jordan agree to give us unrestricted access that in ordinary conditions would strengthen our competitive position with it inside the West Bank? This is an issue we must be aware of, and we must build our policy on that basis. The relationship with the Jordanian regime is one of basic conflict over the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Bilal al-Hasan: I have an observation that I hope we get a reply to. Those who carried out the talks with the Jordanian regime reached the conclusion that the talks had to be suspended. This was officially recorded in the Executive Committee's report to the recent session of the National Council. Although guerilla factions found out that the dialogue with the Jordanian regime had been suspended, the organizations' propaganda campaign against the dialogue and against the parties that were involved in it continued. This raises an urgent question: Why did the propaganda campaign continue, and what was its objective? I am saying that this propaganda campaign weakened the morale of our people inside the country. I am indeed saying that the principal objective of this propaganda campaign was the interest every organization had in heightening the degree of mobilization within its ranks and proving the veracity of its official proclaimed position. The objective of the campaign was not to deal realistically with the problem of the dialogue with the Jordanian regime which had practically come to a stop. This interest in mobilizing and rallying the organization was carried out without much attention being paid to the effect of the propaganda campaign on the condition of our people in the occupied areas.

Muhammad Khalifah: In this matter we must not isolate the position from the circumstances under which a decision was made. In observing the subject of the dialogue [one notes that] there was a clear and an unequivocal objective which was manifested in the fact that the Jordanian regime was not to be allowed to join the course of Camp David. This was accomplished sometimes through friendly dialogue and sometimes through pressure.

During the stage of the campaign against the dialogue, there were assumptions and indicators which affirmed [fears] that King Husayn would join Camp David and that the dialogue had to be stopped. That is, pressure instead of political dialogue was to be utilized in this matter. This is the first point: we must not isolate the position from the circumstances that surround it.

The other side that I wish to discuss is the dialogue itself. The dialogue has not yet stopped, and this constitutes a serious threat since the Jordanian regime is still insisting on informing all international and Arab parties that it will not allow one guerilla to enter Jordan. Thus, the Jordanian regime's position on the PLO and on its future and role was firm and based on principle. Accordingly, we had to have firm positions that were based on principle despite the fact that we occasionally need to engage in some dialogues.

Regarding relations between the PLO and the regime in Jordan I recall that that problem was brought up for discussion after the Rabat Conference, and during that discussion King Husayn was forced to recognize the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. King Husayn recognized the PLO [as the organization] that was responsible for the destiny of Palestinian territory under occupation, including the West Bank.

However, Jordan continued to pay lip service to the matter and did not take any practical measures in that regard until the resolutions of the Ninth Summit Conference came out in 1978. [At that time] Jordan assumed a position opposed to Camp David, and it was after that that the joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee was formed.

It is my judgment that the Palestinian side which represents the PLO did not assume a firm position so as to take advantage of this situation. This means that it did not take away maximum capabilities for action in Jordan, such as at least the freedom of political action and the release of scores of prisoners who are still in the regime's prisons in Jordan.

Regarding the joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee, its function is to undertake support of the opposition in the occupied land. We know that this problem is extremely important because there is an Israeli policy that is based on destroying our national and economic institutions in the occupied land, such as municipal councils and others.

Support can be offered through the joint committee, and it has actually been offered to some of these institutions and national organizations. However, facts indicate that throughout the past 3 years the Jordanian side was able to reap considerable benefits from the committee. Jordanians used the committee to strengthen their aides' positions so that the office of the occupied land, which is affiliated with the government in Jordan, can interfere in the affairs of national organizations and institutions. The second problem is that the Palestinian party in the negotiations has to add representatives who know what is going on in the occupied land. There must also be, for example, a plan for agricultural and industrial development upon which the joint committee would rely in its action. Naturally, a principal portion of the aid must be directed to support the national forces that play a prominent role in confronting the occupation.

These tasks were approved by the National Council. Adhering to them and acting accordingly is required.

Abu 'Ali Mustafa: To avoid being redundant and restating our position on the matter of dialogue and relations with the Jordanian regime, it is appropriate that we raise some questions in earnest without giving ourselves justifications on how a way out of the crisis can be found. This is the crisis in which the leadership of the PLO led itself during the course of the relationship.

Despite the fact that the tactic is understood and is legitimate and despite the fact that it may be justified in any relationship between two conflicting powers that is not based on tactics, any political leadership must calculate the degrees of benefit from this tactic as viewed by the other party. In other words, we are not to think that we are the intelligent ones who are capable of formulating

tactics while the Jordanian regime is not practicing the same thing in its relationship with us. I believe that it would have been appropriate to pause and scrutinize the situation so we can determine the benefits that the [Jordanian] regime would reap from its relationship with us and judge results on that basis. What happened is that we avoided scrutinizing this point, and we considered [the matter of] setting conditions in the Palestinian National Council's plan to be enough to constitute the required controls.

If my colleague Muhammad Khalifah will allow me, I will disagree with his assessment that we were in the process of looking for ways to prevent the Jordanian regime from joining Camp David. I do not believe that it was the relationship with the PLO or the Arab resolution that prevented the Jordanian regime from joining Camp David. There are material considerations which the Jordanian regime cannot abandon on its own so as to turn to Camp David. It was these considerations that made the Jordanian regime make the political decision not to become a party to the Camp David process. Even U.S. officials, including Brzezinski, announced that the United States understood the Jordanian regime's position. In other words the United States understood the fact that the Jordanian regime was stalling. Jordan was waiting for conditions to become rife so as to make it qualified to become a hopeful partner in the Camp David process. Jordan was waiting for Israel's position [to become clear] on the matter of offering the Jordanian regime a share in the settlement. Jordan was waiting for the U.S. position which wishes to achieve a step by step settlement that would not push the entire area into a major explosion that U.S. policy could not tolerate. Jordan was waiting for an end to "the Palestinian obstacle" that exists on the Lebanese scene. The elimination of this obstacle constitutes a preparatory step for the Jordanian regime, enabling it to scuttle the national Syrian regime that opposes Camp David. Because of its proximity to Jordan, the national Syrian regime is an obstacle that is preventing Jordan from being free of this political, geographical, moral and material consideration in making its political decision. It was all these reasons that made Jordan's regime make the consistent decision that served its own tactics of not joining Camp David.

The resolution of the Baghdad Summit, which was approved by all the Arab regimes, gave the Jordanian regime a political and an economic cover. Under the pretext of spending "opposition funds," it obliged the leadership of the PLO to accept the Jordanian regime as its partner in making Palestinian national decisions. These were the motives behind the Arab decision that was made in Baghdad. The motives for that decision were not support for the Palestinian people. Since these Arab regimes had adopted a resolution considering the PLO the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, why then would they come up with a decision at the Baghdad Summit considering the Jordanian regime our partner in the distribution of 150 million dollars? The decision was made in that form because it was controlled by a specific, political setting whose purpose was to create a way whereby the Jordanian regime would be allowed to circumvent the 1974 Rabat resolution itself. It is on this basis that we consider the PLO's previous and present tactics to be losing tactics.

We must say here for the record that the level of activity of the Jordanian regime's group in the occupied land after a relationship was established with the Jordanian regime was higher than it was before 1977.

The Jordanian regime benefited from the cover that was provided for its elements inside the occupied land. It thus became possible for those people to wonder: why they should be accused of having relations with the Jordanian regime, when the leadership of the PLO itself was developing a relationship with the Jordanian regime! PLO leaders did not dare announce a unified position in response to the "royal decree" that was issued in mid October 1980. That decree stipulated the formation of a Jordanian ministerial committee responsible for the affairs of the occupied land. No unified Palestinian position was declared in the press, in the media or in statements; there was silence regarding that decision. Why?

With regard to supporting our people's opposition in the occupied areas, we think that it is possible to look for special methods to provide such support, if the principles for providing the requirements of support are based on principles and programs such as protecting the land, developing agriculture, protecting industry from take-over, protecting education and national culture and other issues which can actually be tasks whose responsibility would be borne collectively by the revolution's leaders.

I do not believe that we will encounter obstacles which we cannot overcome and which would prevent our support from reaching our people in the occupied land if communications between the leadership of the PLO and the Jordanian regime were to come to a halt.

I will mention here a few examples to indicate how the resolution regarding support for our Palestinian people in the occupied land was circumvented. There is, for example, Ibrahim Abu Sittah's project in the Gaza Strip. I do not understand the innocence in the political sense of supporting this project with thousands of dinars while controls are tightened on national institutions such as the board of the Bir Zeit or Bethlehem students' association, etc.

I do not understand how Bassam al-Shak'ah or any national mayor would go to Amman and spend days and weeks until the aid earmarked for the municipality is disbursed when another mayor can go to Amman and receive the aid immediately and without delay. I do not understand this taking place without political motivation.

Finally, for the future of our people's struggle and to protect our Palestinian national decision, I do not believe that there is a legitimate reason for maintaining such a relationship, whether we call it a dialogue or a relationship of having joint committees, especially since the new Israeli situation, following the victory of the Likud in the elections, may enable the Jordanian regime to maneuver for a longer period of time than it had done previously.

Muhammad Khalifah: I want to explain that when I mentioned that the motive of the PLO in engaging the Jordanian regime in a dialogue was to bring the regime's posture on Camp David to a standstill, I did not think that that was the only factor in that matter. I agree with Abu 'Ali Mustafa about the other factors and, of course, I am not ignoring the role of the PLO. But I want to add a point in return. We established a dialogue with the Jordanian regime, and we neglected to support the Jordanian national forces in their struggle. This was one of the pitfalls of the PLO.

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh: We all know that the Camp David Accords placed Arab reactionaries, including the Jordanian regime, in a critical position. Our role has been and still is to take advantage of that critical position and to make it more critical, not to ease it. We dealt with the question of dialogue with Jordan from this premise, especially after the Camp David accords. At least we had no illusions about the long-term political objectives of the Jordanian government regarding realigning the occupied areas with Jordan. We had no illusions about Jordan's objectives regarding the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people, especially in the occupied areas. The problem was not here at all. The problem can be summarized, as the question states it in an inverted manner, in the fact that we set out to deal with the role and position of the Palestinian party in both the political dialogue and in the context of the joint committee. In other words, we wanted at least to correct the method of action of the Palestinian party in this dialogue so as to block the Jordanian government's attempts to take advantage of this dialogue to strengthen its influence in the occupied areas.

We considered this matter a defensive task that would have consequences in the occupied areas, in Jordan or even on the Arab scene. The problem lay and still lies in the role and in the position of the Palestinian party and in its treatment of this relationship. The problem does not lie in recognizing or not recognizing the truth about the current and long-term intentions and objectives of the Jordanian party. It was from this premise that this question was approached by the National Council. It was from this same premise that it was approached inside the National Council. In my judgment the treatment of the question that took place inside the National Council was essentially more progressive than those general treatments that had taken place outside the council. This is because the council dealt in a concrete and detailed way with the experience of that relationship during the previous period: it dealt with the political relationship and with the relationship [between the PLO and Jordan] in the context of the joint committee. We've set principles in the National Council which we believe are still appropriate for correcting this relationship, especially regarding the work of the joint committee. We know that the function of this committee is to support the opposition [in the occupied land]. This means that it must see its principal function as resisting the occupation's policy and the occupation's measures to usurp the land and to expand [its hold on it]. In addition, the committee is to support national institutions and organizations in general. The policy that was adopted by the previous committee generally lacked such a foundation. Regarding settlement and divesting the land [of its inhabitants], for example, support was directed to large landowners and farmers in the occupied land, whereas none was given to small farmers whose land ownership was limited, even though it is the small farmers who are hurt the most by the occupation's economic and settlement policy. In confronting such conduct, it was emphasized that this policy should be corrected by directing support to the establishment of agricultural cooperatives for small farmers. These cooperatives were to be expanded and encouraged on the broadest scale so as to utilize the land and avoid [the situation wherein resident] would leave the land to go to the Israeli employment market.

There is another example that has to do with the matter of emigration.

Large numbers of Palestinian intellectuals and professionals are emigrating every year from the occupied areas. The role of the Steadfastness Support Committee should not be that of directing support to this or the other person or to this or

the other imaginary institution. That role should be to develop national industries; to develop the role of national institutions, trade unions and associations; to develop the housing projects that are supervised by the municipalities; and to create new work opportunities for intellectuals and professionals in the occupied land and support their steadfastness. The same [principle] applies to national industries and to other aspects of economic activity. In addition, trade unions, institutions and associations are to be supported in a balanced manner on the basis of their role in the struggle against the occupation; that should be the principal standard. This is the trend which was emphasized by the recent National Council after a sharp debate [following which] the National Council set down detailed principles [for that trend]. The problem is that the policy of the Jordanian government is at odds with ours. Therefore, we must not yield to that policy lest that cause the Palestinian party to refrain from undertaking its duty in that regard.

With regard to the joint committee, ever since the Baghdad Summit we have been calling for--and we are still calling for--the actual application of the Arab resolution that the PLO is the only representative of the Palestinian people. We affirmed that at the recent National Council. This means that the PLO alone should be responsible for these funds, and the Jordanian party is to accommodate the organization, not become its equal partner. Sometimes it is even more than an equal partner with regard to supporting the steadfastness effort.

This is the principle that we are still adopting. We asserted at the recent National Council [meeting] that reorganizing the Palestinian party in the Steadfastness Support Committee was necessary, but that decision is awaiting implementation. Regarding the political dialogue, the problem still exists. This means that the Jordanian government's position on the Camp David accords, which did not give the Jordanians any role, is not to become involved in this deal. But this constitutes only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is for the Jordanian government to offer all forms of assistance and support to the PLO so it can turn its position on Camp David into a positive policy. In this case it is the duty of the PLO to reveal on a continuing basis the results it achieves in the context of this political dialogue. It is to combine dialogue with the continued struggle against the foot-dragging efforts of the Jordanian government regarding the rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO, and especially regarding to our people in the occupied areas. But it is regrettable that the PLO's role in the course of that dialogue was one-dimensional. It was in front of this question that the National Council paused to lay down the principles of dialogue in a detailed manner.

The problem that we are facing, especially inside Jordan, is manifested in the fact that large numbers of PLO fighters, who are members of the National Council and who belong to the other national forces, are not playing their part in the joint committee supporting the steadfastness effort. They are not even expressing their opinions regarding how the political dialogue should be conducted and how the maneuvers of the Jordanian government regarding the demands and the rights of the PLO should be confronted.

This question concerns a broad sector of our people, especially those in Jordan. Ignoring this matter will actually result in our people in Jordan viewing this relationship in a negative light. I repeat: we have no illusions about the

long-term political intentions of the Jordanian government. But this does not mean that we define the intentions without having a current defensive, political and tactical role with which we can confront and surround these intentions and prevent them from being realized over the long term.

Bilal al-Hasan: Are there any other observations about this matter?

Majid Abu Sharar: I will discuss the subject of the joint committee which I did not deal with in my first comments. The principal objective of this committee is to support the steadfastness of our people in the occupied land. It is most certainly not the best channels through which this support can reach our people, but so far it is the one that is possible. In addition to what the Palestinian National Council has asked this committee to do, I would like to add that ever since work began on this committee, Jordan has tried to shirk many of its obligations to municipalities, to civil servants, to associations and to many institutions. Jordan has tried to transfer the sums that it used to allocate in its annual budget to the budget of the joint committee.

There is also no doubt that Jordan revived the office of the occupied land in Amman--Jordan office--so that it now has more influence on our people in the occupied land than it did have any time in the past. In return, we must not disregard the fact that the committee was able to offer our people in the occupied land services that definitely cannot be ignored. It allocated large sums of money to shore up municipalities, housing projects, water projects, industrialization projects and other projects. Among these projects was that of establishing a plant for processing citrus fruits in the Gaza Strip, for example. Recently the committee decided to pay monthly salaries to West Bank civil servants who receive one salary. Furthermore, it took measures to stabilize the steadfastness of [university] graduates inside the occupied land. We must not overlook these matters. There is no doubt that the enemy too is not overlooking them. Recently, the enemy decided to ban all housing projects, especially in the area of Jerusalem. But when we put these projects on the record, we also state on the record that the Jordanian regime derives more benefits from this committee than we do. Ultimately, however, we are achieving a national objective: we are supporting the steadfastness of our people inside the occupied land.

We must also develop the action of the committee, but we must also set up controls for it by restructuring the delegation according to the recommendation made by the Palestinian National Council during its recent session. We must try to determine the magnitude of Jordan's benefits from this committee. We must strive to abolish the Jordanian role in this committee and restore that role to the status it had before the Baghdad Summit. Jordan's role then was merely one of coordination. Before the Baghdad Summit Jordan had no right to interfere in the allocation of any sum of money for supporting our people in the occupied land.

One final observation that remains is this: The Baghdad Summit allocated 150 million dollars to support the steadfastness of our people inside the occupied land. At the recent summit in Amman the committee requested that that sum be increased to about 460 million dollars. So far that allocation has not been increased. There is no doubt that this sum can meet only a very meager portion of our people's needs. This requires that the Executive Committee apply pressure, especially to the oil countries, to increase the volume of support for our people inside the occupied land.

REVOLUTION PROSECUTOR-GENERAL DISCUSSES SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1982

[19 May 82 p 2]

[Text] ETTELA'AT News Service--Hojjatoleslam Musavi-Tabrizi, the revolution prosecutor-general of the Islamic Republic of Iran, took part in an exclusive interview with our correspondent, responding to his questions concerning the various issues of the day. The revolution prosecutor-general, concerning the trial of Qotbzadeh and other members of the overthrow network explained: The case of Qotbzadeh and other members of the uncovered network is at the investigation and interrogation stage. Recently, it has been reported to me that all of the interrogations are approximately completed and they might be tried next month. It should be mentioned that all the conspirators of this network, including Qotbzadeh, 'Abbasi, Mahdavi, 'Abdolreza Hejazi, the few military personnel, and other members of the network, will be tried together in one court headed by Mr Mohammadi-Reyshahri, the head of the Islamic revolution military courts.

Concerning the rumor of coloring the arms of all those who wear short sleeve shirts, Hojjatoleslam Musavi-Tabrizi said: This action is against the religion and the laws and as it has been reported to me, it is done to men. This action is the molestation of Muslims; it is religiously prohibited; and it is a sin. This action is also a violation of human freedom and the people's rights. If anyone does this, he must be arrested and punished.

Concerning the interference of the court for combating prohibited actions in the affairs of the theaters on Lalehzar, he said: When you ask whether the court for combating prohibited actions is permitted to interfere in the affairs of theaters and cinemas, several points must be explained. Is the court for combating prohibited actions allowed to set programs for theaters? No, it is not.

In response, it must be asked: Is the court for combating prohibited actions allowed to establish theaters or cinemas? No, it is not. But, when it is observed that in a theater, an

offensive and irreligious play is performed, in that case, the court for combating prohibited actions is allowed to investigate. The issue that has recently become known and has also been reported in the magazines is the issue of the interference of this court in the affairs of the theaters. I must say that during the time of Mr Khalkhali, who was in the anti-narcotics court, the theaters were confiscated. These theaters have been entrusted to someone to manage and put the revenues gained from them into the treasury. However, in regards to the management of films or plays or management in general, even though the representative of the anti-narcotics court might be present, and from the standpoint of the plays and films and the quality of the films and plays and those who perform them, all must be investigated and regulated by the Ministry of Guidance.

The revolution prosecutor-general said, concerning the continuing work permits of some of the theater actors: The actors of the theaters have not been given permits to act somewhere [as published].

Of the cases that I have seen, of course, they have not done the right thing; I do not mean to say that they were right to do so. The problem here is that they over emphasize this issue, saying that they have gotten permits to act. But what they intend to do is create a commotion. However, this might not be the case at all.

When a number of previous actors and actresses were arrested and taken to the court for combating prohibited actions, some of them were corrupt and were either executed or jailed. Another group had been out of work at the time; they were unemployed and the Pahlavi culture was promoting their talents for its own ends. This group was ready to offer their talents to the culture of the revolution. When this group was freed from prison or the courts, they pledged not to have anything irreligious in their work. That is, they would not have offensive dances, vulgar music, etc. Under these conditions, they began to work. Here, the owner of the theater or the Ministry of Guidance has a choice to employ these individuals under certain conditions if they are found to be good. If they are not found to be sound and good, they are not employed.

The court for combating prohibited actions has not insisted that they should absolutely be employed. When they were released from prison, they declared that they were able to work under these conditions. We have many sinners in the society who have now been reformed and have conformed themselves to the revolution. The same goes for them.

The revolution prosecutor-general continued: Of course, these actions were done before we came, during the time of the former

representative of the prosecutor of the court for combating prohibited actions. I did not agree with this action in principle. I even opposed their going to work after signing this pledge. It is not a responsibility of the court for combating prohibited actions to accept pledges and say that they are permitted to work. I was also against this issue.

[20 May 82 p 18]

The Present Condition of the Minigroups from the Standpoint of the Social, Political, and Military Situation

Concerning the present condition of the minigroups, the revolution prosecutor-general said: Thank God, the minigroups have not made any progress from the standpoint of their social position. They are continually involved in inhuman actions, such as blind terrorism in the streets and alleys.

The revolution prosecutor-general added:

Politically, in relations with foreign countries, especially when the government of the Islamic Republic is achieving total victory in the war of right against wrong, the government of the Islamic Republic is able to present its views to the world.

Consequently, when the government can speak from a position of perfect stability and firmness, the minigroups will no longer have customers abroad. The political players who interview Bani-Sadr, Rajavi, or others every day, interviews which were broadcast through the Western bugles, now have realized that they cannot be influential in Iran or in international circles with the nonsensical talk of Bani-Sadr, Rajavi, or others. Hence, they have been defeated politically as well.

Concerning the military situation of the minigroups, the revolution prosecutor-general said: From the military and terroristic standpoint, with political and ideological motivation, they are trying to be active and to do something. Certainly, they must plan their work on the basis of special goals and work according to those goals. When they come to a dead end and they are defeated, they have to indulge in a series of blind actions. Only the terrorists of the world indulge in a series of terrorist actions. After the events of 20 June, we asked them: Why do you indulge in terrorist acts? They answered: Because the majority of the people are with us; we want to establish a just government on the basis of true Islam and bring to power the government that the people want. This was the slogan of these individuals and this was their goal. At that time, they thought that if they, for instance, assassinated the president and the prime minister, or they bombed the Prime Minister's Office, they were fighting the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But after the martyrdom of the president or the prime minister, they saw that the people moved more towards the regime of the Islamic Republic and that in the

political dimension as well, the people cooperated with the government of the Islamic Republic. At that time, they became disappointed in the people. They realized that their slogans of the first days could not be implemented any longer and that the people did not believe them. They thought to themselves that they should assassinate more of the personalities even if they are killed themselves. Consequently, they started to attack the people in revenge.

It is here that blind and aimless acts of terrorism begin. Now it makes no difference to them if it is a child, an old man, or a tradesman. By setting off grenades and explosives in gutters where innocent people walk, they try to create terror and fear.

He said: Presently, they walk about in the streets aimlessly. If they happen to pass a clergyman or a faithful person, they start shooting at them without knowing anything about them. Or they go to schools in Guards Corps clothing and with forged papers, gather a number of the members of the Islamic society of that school in some place and run away after they set explosives in the school. Or they place a bomb in Imam Khomeyni Mosque. There is no special person there. The mosque belongs to the public.

The Discovery of Safehouses

The revolution prosecutor-general continued: In connection with the members of the belligerent minigroups, I must say that 90 percent of them have been arrested.

Also, with the help of the 36 million members of the intelligence organization and the cooperation and coordination of the Guards Corps, committees, and law enforcement officials, the central cadre of the hypocrites, including the treacherous Musa Khiabani, was discovered and annihilated. In the second stage of the operations, after one and a half months of surveillance and pursuit, about 14 safehouses were discovered. From the safehouses, about 60 of the top members of the organization were either captured or killed. Of these members, there are no more than 200-300 throughout the country.

After these operations, another safehouse was also discovered, in which another nine active members of the hypocrites, including Javad Fazel, were killed. Following this, two additional safehouses were discovered. In each house, four persons were captured and the rest were killed.

On the whole, in the course of the last two weeks, 86 high ranking members of the hypocrites and the leaders of these belligerent minigroups have, thank God, either been captured or killed by the Hezbollah.

He said: Occasionally, they carry out a series of blind actions in order to give a boost to the remnants of the belligerent minigroups and to let them know that they are there. For this reason, they carry out terrorist acts or armed robberies. However, the people, the committees, the Guards Corps, the police, and the authorities must pay attention and must be aware that these individuals, even if their center has been annihilated and dispersed with only three persons remaining, will commit terrorist acts out of revenge.

The Supervisor of the Free Theater

Concerning the arrest of the supervisor of the theaters of the Ministry of Guidance, Hojjatoleslam Musavi-Tabrizi said: It was not an arrest, but a proclamation of guilt. The court for combating prohibited actions filed a proclamation of guilt against Mr Hoseynkhani and he was summoned. He came to the revolution prosecutor of the capital and his case was filed in the Revolution Prosecutor's Office of the capital. Presently, Mr Hoseynkhani is free and his case is under investigation.

The Activities of Revolution Courts

Concerning the work of revolution courts, the revolution prosecutor-general said: The revolution courts have not reduced their work and activities. At that time, we had much work to do and the court authorities worked round the clock on the cases of the accused. Now there are fewer arrests. Consequently, fewer cases are filed and the work of the courts is subsequently less.

The Courts Must Be Decisive

Another issue is that sometimes certain trials are carried out in the high courts and the gentlemen must note that terrorist acts and explosions happen and our best young people are killed by the hypocrites [as published]. The authorities of the courts must all show their decisiveness and know that if they are careless, they will be responsible for the pure blood of the martyrs. The high courts which issue the final verdicts must take into consideration that this terrorist group, which is being tried, is made up of traitors who are opposed to Islam and the Koran and who have set out to destroy Islam and the Koran. They want to destroy security and create fear and terror. There is no doubt of their belligerence.

The Women Accept the Culture of the Revolution

Concerning the veil, Hojjatoleslam Musavi-Tabrizi said: Women who do not wear the veil must conform themselves to the culture of the revolution. It has now been about four years since our glorious revolution and still some women come out made up. This

is against the religion. It is ignoring the instructions of the Koran, it is a sin, and it is punishable. Non-veiling is part of the Pahlavi culture and was forced upon the society by Reza Khan. To rid ourselves of the tyrant, all the signs of the tyrant must be eliminated and non-veiling is one of the signs of the tyrant.

The Court and the Public Prosecutor's Office for Guild-Related Affairs Shall Have a New Form

Concerning the changes of the special court and the public prosecutor's office for guild-related affairs, the revolution prosecutor-general said: The prosecutor and the head of the special courts for guild-related affairs have been changed. Presently, the new authorities of the special court and the prosecutor's office for guild-related affairs are reorganizing. For this reason, the activities of the prosecutor's office have been reduced. We hope that in the near future, we will witness significant activities in the prosecutor's office and the special court for guild-related affairs.

Fighting Stockpiling and Overpricing

Concerning the fight against smugglers and economic terrorists and eliminating stockpiling and overpricing, he said: Islamic injunctions must be carried out concerning price hikers and stockpilers. If we decisively carry out the Islamic injunctions concerning profiteering elements, economic terrorists, and price hikers, we will no longer have any problems. At the present time, this is our problem, because after the revolution, this problem was not dealt with decisively. They did not allow the Islamic rulings concerning economic terrorists to be carried out. We ask the authorities of the special court for guild-related affairs to deal decisively with price hikers, stockpilers, opportunists, and profiteers. Meanwhile, the government must make an effort to establish cooperative companies.

Warning to the Nation of the Hezbollah and the Authorities

In conclusion, the revolution prosecutor-general warned the nation of the Hezbollah and the national authorities and said: The people must be alert, because the treacherous terrorists strike in stores, streets, homes, and private or government offices. The people must watch the traffic of suspicious individuals. Some of these terrorists come dressed as members of the Guards Corps, prosecutor's officials, or committee guards to homes and take the members of families away to unknown places. Then they force them to contact their families to say that they are in such and such a committee. The family of that person comes to the committee and realizes that there is no one there. Then, the terrorists kill that person. The Revolution Prosecutor General's Office warns the nation of the Hezbollah to be alert,

to contact and make inquiries from the Prosecutor's Office, the central committee, and the Guards Corps immediately in regards to persons who come as guards or officials of the Prosecutor's Office. The principals of schools especially should pay attention not to allow just anyone to enter the school to contact the students.

Warning to Homeowners

The revolution prosecutor-general said: Those who are renting their houses must be careful to whom they rent. They should not lease their houses until they have made inquiries about the person. If they happen to confront a suspicious situation, they should inform the Revolution Prosecutor's Office. If they do not do so, their action will be considered a crime and the homeowner will be prosecuted.

Authorities who are responsible for national security, such as the Ministry of Interior, the police, the Guards Corps, and the Islamic revolution committees, must work harder and deal decisively with the offenders, hypocrites, and terrorists. They must purge these terrorists from the Islamic society and eliminate them. They must carry out the Islamic injunctions powerfully and must not be afraid of sinister foreign propaganda.

9593

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ROLE OF ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC PROPAGANDA REITERATED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 May 82 p 3

[Text] In a speech yesterday afternoon before a seminar of the supervisory councils of the offices of Islamic propaganda Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, member of the Guardian Council, called for the expansion of this organization in all parts of the country and said: The Organization of Islamic Propaganda must cover the entire country with Islamic propaganda. Concerning the matter of the mobilization, which will be announced at special and sensitive times to perform specified tasks, he said: We already have a kind of mobilization which is a mobilization for religious and scholarly propaganda, and you are members of this mobilization.

He also said: A special group of aware people must be equipped for religious propaganda. Those who take on the mission of propaganda must be fully recognized. Their backgrounds must be fully documented and they must be well prepared for this task.

The Organization of Islamic Propaganda must cover the entire country with a blanket of religious propaganda.

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani also said: The clergy is a powerful arm for the Islamic Republic. You must continue to preserve its independence, which has existed previously, and not rely on the government and a government budget. You must utilize instead the great assistance of the people.

He added: Brothers, try to bring about harmony, unity of step, and intellectual and scholarly cooperation between the clergy and the other organs and do not deal in terms of individuals and groups.

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani added: Matters pertaining to the Tehran mosques are the responsibility of the Society of Combative Clerics of Tehran. If the Organization of Islamic Propaganda or other clerical organizations or individuals intend to intervene in mosque affairs and issues that have some bearing on the clergy, they must first raise the subject at the Society of Combative Clerics of Tehran and then inform the media and/or the mosques through the channel of this society.

Ethics and Propaganda

Then Hojjatoleslam Emami Kashani gave a talk on the subject of ethics and propaganda, having pure intentions, and working sincerely. He said: In order to foster Islamic education first the Organization of Islamic Propaganda must have a place and facilities.

The seminar's next speaker was Hojjatoleslam Shar'i, member of the Supreme Council of Islamic Propaganda, who spoke briefly on the supervisory techniques of the organization's members in the provinces, the fulfillment of responsibilities, harmony, role of the propaganda offices in alleviating difficulties in the provinces, and the encounters of office officials with units, groups, and individuals. He told officials from the offices: Try to create classes on thought, belief, and ethics and do not encourage carelessness.

Islamic propaganda offices must serve to resolve conflicts between national and governmental units and organs.

He also said: Establish classes in the area for other clergymen and teach them instructional techniques.

The Seminar Resolution

Then the seminar concluded its work with the issuance of a 12-article resolution, the text of which follows.

- 1- Congratulations on the wonderful victories of the fighting knights and the pride of Islam in the victories of Operation Jerusalem. All speed to the heroic assaults of those dear ones aimed at overthrowing as quickly as possible the infidel Ba'th regime ruling Iraq.
- 2- With a view to the expansion of the organization's facilities and responsibilities and the necessity of cooperation from government organizations and organs, we call upon the Supreme Council of Islamic Propaganda to take steps to clarify the organization's legal position.
- 3- We call upon the Supreme Council of Islamic Propaganda and the organization's leadership to devote more attention to matters of the organization, the expansion of basic planning and foundation-laying in relation to facilities for teaching, the arts, and other things through the utmost possible strengthening of the organization's central committees and units, and to seek to profit from the views and proposed plans of offices throughout the country.
- 4- While stabilizing the organization's center in Tehran in order to facilitate executive matters and preserve the pivotal character of the Qom Seminary for Islamic propaganda, we call for the establishment of "organic" [as published] relations between the Qom Islamic Propaganda Office and the organization's center in Tehran.

5- We ask the respected leadership and the organization's center to take action on the excellent views of the Supreme Council of Propaganda concerning the rapid implementation of all the enactments of the five commissions of the Seminar of Councils and Office Directors of 10 May 82.

6- We call for the creation of institutional and substantive relations between the municipalities and a provincial council acting as a central province council and between the central province councils and the Supreme Council of Islamic Propaganda.

7- In view of the importance of the role of the Islamic societies in the defense and advancement of the goals of the Islamic revolution as strongholds for the partisans of God party in the offices, factories, schools and elsewhere, we call upon the organization to see to their situation for the purpose of buttressing, strengthening and guiding them on the basis of the law.

8- We call upon the Supreme Council of Islamic Propaganda and the country's officials to take appropriate measures to implement all aspects of the martyred Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i's (May his grave be sanctified) circulated letter concerning partiality towards popular Islamic propaganda on the part of the organization.

9- In view of the fact that teaching is the organization's most basic task and that the seminaries are the richest and most genuine sources of Islamic culture it is necessary that all instructional planning, the procurement of textbooks in the primary, elementary, and secondary schools, and the short and long-range educational planning of teachers and propagandists take place with the cooperation of the seminaries.

10- In view of the genuine aspirations of a martyr-nurturing nation and the idol-smashing Imam in the area of exporting Islamic revolutionary thought outside the country, propagating the Islamic mission among the dear Iranian students outside the country as well as Muslims in other countries, awakening the deprived and the oppressed, as well as frustrating the relentless assaults of the propaganda and media imperialists, we call upon the Supreme Council of Propaganda to activate the issue of propaganda outside the country as soon as possible and to break up its current state of stagnation.

11- We call for the expansion of the organization's cooperation with the respected clergy in the municipalities, the avoidance of haphazardness and duplication of effort, an increase in the depth of propaganda, and the directing of attention to preservation of the propaganda line taken by the theologians and the chief theologian.

12- In the course of specifying the responsibilities of the Islamic Propaganda Council for Cooperation we call for its expansion in the municipalities and strengthening its relationship with the organization.

EDUCATIONAL, STUDENT AFFAIRS AIRED

Opening of Technological Schools

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 10 Apr 82 p 2

[Report by Minister of Education and Guidance Parvaresh]

[Text] The Ministry of Education and Guidance has announced:

With trust in God Most High and thanks for His blessings especially the existence of our Imam and with greetings to the pure souls of the immortal martyrs of the Islamic Revolution. The first stage of the reopening of the technological school will begin on Saturday, 10 April 1982 (today) with the report of Brother Parvaresh, Minister of Education and Guidance.

In this period, those university students who have up to 21 class units remaining of their education in seven provinces--Tehran, Esfahan, Semnan, Yazd, Fars and East Azarbaijan--will begin new educational schedules. The text of the announcement of the Minister of Education and Guidance regarding the reopening of the technological schools is as follows.

In the Name of God the Merciful and the Compassionate

We are not afraid of economic restrictions; we are not afraid of military intervention; that which does frighten us is educational dependence; we are afraid of imperialist universities. "Imam Khomeyni"

On the fourth anniversary of the spring of freedom and the establishment of the Islamic system of justice and the threshold of a year of planning and reconstruction, the schools of technology of the Ministry of Education and Guidance, with the help of God, are to be reopened.

After the decision and the approval by the Islamic Revolutionary Council, because of the need for a cultural revolution, the technological schools along with other centers of higher education were temporarily closed on 5 June 1980. The purpose was to bring an end to the abject condition of the centers of science. Now the time has come to reopen these centers with the aim of making the educational centers as Islamic in form as possible.

During the period of the temporary closure of these centers, many changes have taken place in the country which, with the help of God, the guidance of the Imam and the assistance of the nation of God's party, will result in the further strengthening of the Islamic Republic system and the jurisdiction of its laws. During this period, the imperialists imposed the war with the hirling Iraqi regime on the Islamic Republic of Iran. After one and a half years of valiant resistance in the defense of Islam, the supporters of Saddam have been forced to surrender and are looking for a way to escape and save themselves. The superpowers of the East and the West and their puppets have also been disgraced. Now the country is moving towards a period of reconstruction. More than at any other time, the country needs the contributions of men of faith and commitment. You who have decided to continue your education in these centers must be aware of the past deviations of some of the educational institutions, the atmosphere of hostility created by dependent small groups, the aimless increase of university students, the lack of efficiency, the alienation of most graduates from the work environment and society, the alienation of most of them from Islamic training and education and the sway of corrupt Western cultures. Bear in mind: Your brothers in the educational offices of the institutes of higher learning are sparing no efforts to negate false values, maintain continuing communication with the master of the cultural revolution and other related institutions, report on seminars, investigate scientific centers, prepare statistics and information on buildings and equipment, managing the consolidation or dissolution of unnecessary courses, and what ever else is necessary to prepare plans which will be acceptable under the present conditions. You, dear ones, must also do your utmost to use your time and strength in the acquiring of specializations, skills and acquaintance with the knowledge of Islam, so that, with the help of God, you may cleanse your souls, work to reduce the problems left by the former regime and its imperialistic education, and actualize your own effective plan for the reconstruction of an Islamic Iran.

God Willing Seyyed Akbar Parvaresh, Minister of Education and Training of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Rules for Study Abroad

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 May 82 p 2

[Report by Deputy Minister of Higher Education and Training 'Abbas Ta'ab]

[Text] In a press conference today Engineer 'Abbas Ta'ab of the Deputy Ministry of University Students of the Ministry of Higher Education and Training announced the conditions and restrictions for the preliminary examinations to send university students abroad for study.

The Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Higher Education and Training first sent praise and greetings to the martyrs and referring to the attack against the revolution and the German police, expressed his hope to the Iranian university students residing in Germany that the authorities of that country and the Foreign Ministry would take actions concerning this matter as soon as possible.

He then referred to the occurrence of the first examination for sending university students abroad to study, saying that because of new restrictions, this examination would take place in the near future.

The Deputy Minister then announced the qualifications required for applicants taking this examination.

1. Belief in the Islamic Republic of Iran and belief in one of the religious recognized in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. A maximum of 23 years of age for those persons who have a medical exemption or a guarantee or 25 years of age for persons who have completed their compulsory military service.
3. Possession of a document certifying completion of service or a permanent exemption.
4. Possession of a diploma in mathematics, physics, natural sciences or the experimental sciences with a written [test] average of not less than 14.

Referring to the method of selection of the university students, he said that the selection will be according to regions. A proportional quota will be assigned to each province according to the number of high school graduates in each province.

He noted that the examination for university students going abroad will take place towards the end of June of this year and will be in two stages. The examination will include both general and specialized material.

The generalized material will consist of intelligence and educational aptitude, Persian literature, Iranian history of the last 100 years, Islamic education and learnings and foreign language at the high school graduate level.

Some of these questions will be in the form of short questions and others will be in essay form.

The specific fields for the graduates in mathematics will include mathematics, physics, mechanics and chemistry and for the graduates in natural sciences will include natural science, physics and chemistry. In the specialized questions, an attempt will be made to ask general questions and to avoid details.

The Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Higher Education and Training then said: The names of those students who will participate in exams to study abroad, will be published on Wednesday (the day after tomorrow). He added:

"After checking and correcting the mentioned documents, the authorities will announce the names of the candidates who passed the examination. These candidates may accept admission in any of the countries with which the Islamic Republic of Iran has political relations. After receiving acceptance, candidates can take part in the second stage of the examination which will include a comprehensive foreign language test, and Islamic knowledge."

He stressed the importance of knowledge of Islam on the part of the applicants saying that those individual who go abroad must believe so firmly in the teachings of Islam that they will not be captivated by the foreign cultures.

In conclusion, he added that 1,200 students wishing to study abroad will be able to take the examinations.

Student Views on Cultural Revolution

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 May 82 p 15

[Text] KEYHAN Cultural Service--The second three day assembly of the overall Islamic organizations of university students of the universities and centers of higher education took place on the occasion of the commemoration of the second anniversary of the Cultural Revolution, and with the issuing of a statement consisting of 14 articles drew its work to a close.

This three day seminar took place at the Sharif Industrial University on 28 April. Participants proceeded, during the period of the meeting, through the formation of five commissions--culture, plans and schedules, selection and admission, administration and human sciences--with discussion and study.

During the seminary several persons from the membership of the headquarters of executive affairs of the Cultural Revolution, the office of strengthening and unity and representatives of Islamic organizations of university students delivered speeches.

Some of the participants also had an interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani. The seminar drew its work to a close with the presentation of a statement which is described below:

With attention to the emphasis of his Holiness Imam Khomeyni that the Islamization of the universities will take some time, it is necessary that the reopening stage which is once again beginning the educational activities of the university students become the turning point in the acceleration of the Islamization of the universities. The beginning of executive actions must not prevent the utilization of all means in the continuing activity and planning for the realization of Islamic universities.

The reopening stage or the stage of admitting new university students which begins educational activity in the direction of Islamic universities must proceed with the greatest possible changes in content, educational development, administration, values, refining and purification until the universities can continue their existence.

Likewise, in the course of the Islamic Revolution, in order to implement revolutionary aims, the organizations and institutions must take a different form from those of the past and must develop in the Cultural Revolution. In the building of Islamic universities, which are so basically in opposition to the former regime, all of the efforts of the authorities must be to stabilize, strengthen and maintain these inherited institutions. Especially in the

Holy wars of the universities, which are the fruit of great scientific and cultural struggles on the part of committed Muslim university students and professors, their dearly paid for staunch resistance must be against opponents, hypocrites and liberals. Within the present structures, universities must develop which will provide the needs for a revolutionary Islamic society.

In order to eliminate obstacles and difficulties in the two types of educational centers from the past and those institutions requiring purging in this movement and to achieve the principal aims and a lengthy period of Cultural Revolution and its continuity, it is necessary to take rapid and effective steps so that the center of decisionmaking and planning becomes a unit for the country's culture. As a result, other than the revolutionary executive center we will not include any other units.

In order to achieve the formation of one revolutionary executive institution for handling plans and schedules of the Cultural Revolution in the building of Islamic universities, it is necessary to be firmly based on the stabilization, strengthening and continuation of the headquarters of revolutionary affairs, which arose from the inside of the movement. Other institutions from the past must be likewise based.

In the admittance of university students during the reopening stage, while observing the great kindness and liberality of Islam, the admittance of students whose presence would bring about disruption in the implementation of the aims of the Cultural Revolution will be prevented. In the selection of new students, until the conditions in the Islamic universities have attained the desired state, applicants who have faith, belief and commitment in the Islamic Revolution as well as possessing practical qualifications will be selected.

Muslim students after the revolution, under the protection, guidance and guardianship of the Imam of the nation were active, not only in various efforts such as the corps, the religious wars and so on, but also in conquering the nest of spies in the great plan to further the movement of the Islamic Revolution in direct opposition to the great satan, the United States. With faith in the directions emerging from the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, these students began the movement of the Cultural Revolution in the universities by halting the former rotten regime. It is necessary that in the formation of the Islamic associations as well as other organized institutions such as the crusades of the universities be in the direction of supervision, perseverance and continuity of the aims of the Cultural Revolution. These organizations must be very active. All Muslim university students must have faith in and commitment toward the autocratic rule. Their aims and beliefs are in the metamorphosis of the former system of education and in the eventuality of Islamic universities in all dimensions. They will bring to bear their greatest efforts and powers in this struggle to strengthen the organizations.

With attention to the necessity for committed Muslim university students in sensitive positions of the Islamic Republic and likewise to the need of the country for the continuation of their education until they have completed their needed specializations, it is necessary that at those institutions and centers where university students are active, preliminary training and the replacement

of new committed personnel must be effected. In the case of perceived responsibilities, Muslim students must not abandon their posts until their responsibilities have been transferred. Likewise, for the building towards the necessary continuation of the life of the Cultural Revolution, those university students who are in the planning and executive centers such as the headquarters of the Cultural Revolution, the headquarters of executive affairs and the crusade university, must also continue in the fulfilling of their momentuous responsibilities.

For the time being, the headquarters of the Cultural Revolution is taking over training until those university students who are not able to leave their responsibilities in cultural affairs will be able to take their place in the institutions of scientific education and acquire specializations.

In the strengthening of the universities and schools, the long time wish of the Imam and the nation and the most important aim of the cultural revolution, a primary and basic requirement has been the presence, support, cooperation and partnership of the committed and believing clergy in the autocratic rule and the departments of detailed planning and administration, as well as other departments of the Cultural Revolution and the universities. Thanks are due for the actions of the 'Elmiyeh School of Qom, in this endeavor. It is expected that these actions will continue as much as possible.

Decisions and expectations in all of the matters pertaining to the human [social] sciences, which the Imam has emphasized should be relegated to the honored professors of the 'Elmiyeh School, with the cooperation and partnership of the personnel of the universities, matters(?) will be compiled and researched on the basis of Islam. The situation for university students in this field of study will then be clarified.

Because of the great burden of responsibility on the universities under present conditions in the attaining of the aims of the Cultural Revolution and the shortage of personnel who can fill positions of competence in all areas, the most active and complete cooperation of the committed personnel who follow the autocratic rule must be given to the present representatives of the administrative councils of the universities, until the desired state and reinforcement of the universities is reached.

After the formation of university policies for Islamization with the aim of moving towards building Islamic universities, it is necessary that the conditions for the plans presented by the headquarters of the Cultural Revolution in this endeavor become defined, so that as soon as possible the universities are opened.

In the basic plan which believing and committed professors and teachers have constructed for the formation and continuation of Islamic universities and the educational training of university students, with the purpose of securing these aims, the training of teachers on the basis of criteria of piety and belief and commitment to the Islamic Republic must begin as soon as possible.

Professors with faith and belief in the movement of the Cultural Revolution, with awareness of the holy and divine nature of the movement and its continuation, with reliance on God, and with the cooperation of the university students of the Islamic organizations who with their whole beings put forth effort for the securing of Islamic universities, will continue in the perseverance of their struggle for the metamorphosis of the university system until the desired state is attained.

8398

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GAINS OF IRAN NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE FACTORY REPORTED

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 5 May 82 p 10

[Report by Engr Lotfollah Tur Savadkuhi, Iran National official]

[Text] The authorities of the design engineering division of Iran National, at the invitation of the newspapers and news organizations of the country, explained their new activities and progress, stating that the previous design engineering division of Iran National, unfortunately, had not produced results. It functioned in name only. About a year ago, actual work was begun and, presently, significant progress, through the cooperation of faithful and ideological individuals, has been achieved.

Dr Engineer Lotfollah Tur Savadkuhi, who has now been working in the Iran National factories for about a year, said: In the beginning, I began working in the engineering division and, with the help of interested individuals, workers, and ideological technicians, we established the division of design research and development. The management of the factory and other authorities also encouraged and helped us. I think in the future, this new organization will prove to be a large center for research in connection with the motor vehicle industries of the country.

About his education, Dr Savadkuhi said: I specialized in internal combustion engines and completed my doctorate in Romania in natural gas burning engines. My doctoral thesis involves the designing of hydrolic dynamometers as well as the designing of natural gas fueled equipment and systems, which can be directly utilized.

Dr Savadkuhi then explained the inventions and products of this section. He said: We have a design for changing the diesel engines on 302 buses to natural gas burning engines. This design will, in fact, move us towards self-sufficiency in engine manufacturing industries, to change diesel engines into inexpensive natural gas burning engines. Reductions in noise and air pollution are also some of the advantages of this design.

The main importance of this kind of engine lies in the economic dimension and the economic situation of the country, not to mention using the abundant natural gas resources which exist in the country, which will allow us not to depend on diesel fuel, which we are presently importing. The design has been adapted totally by Iranian experts and the altered parts, the moving parts in the combustion chamber, the fueling system, and the combustion system have been altered and completed in Iran National factories.

These natural gas fueled engines have passed the first testing stage. In the next stages, tests will be made on trains. In relation to this project, we are and will remain in touch with Tabriz engine manufacturing factories. These factories will help us to make changes in such parts as pistons. On the whole, this is the first project to change diesel engines to natural gas burning engines completely in Iran. For these changes, we need no foreign help or parts. From this perspective, we are completely self-sufficient. Dr Savadkuhi then added: One of the advantages of the natural gas engine, from the standpoint of its complexity, is that a heavy, highly technical system which includes injector pumps and injectors has been eliminated from the engine and replaced with a spark combustion system. In fact, the power reduction of about 15 percent, which is created as a result of the changeover to natural gas, is compensated by the elimination of the injector pump, which requires about the same amount of energy.

The design of the fuel system is complete. Both cylinders are fed through one vent opening. The engine will actually be fueled by three vent openings. This causes the mixture to enter the engine as additional fuel and not to have a reduction of power. Mr Savadkuhi continued:

There have been projects in the past to change over engines to burn natural gas; however, this plan is about the best one. The engine ignites with the first spark and has no additional shakes and is well balanced. From the standpoint of noise, we can say that this engine creates 50 percent less noise than that of diesel engines.

Another characteristic of the natural gas burning engine is that the internal parts of the engine last longer.

Dr Savadkuhi then said: During the 15 years of relations with industrialized countries, we felt that this factory was technologically weak. Especially in the engine laboratory, we felt that we did not have a genuine understanding of the engines they had sold us. For this reason, we proposed a plan to create engine testing stations. It was suggested that the dynamometers be imported, which would have been a great expense. Therefore, we

began designing one ourselves. This apparatus was made totally by Iranians. It is the first hydrolic dynamometer made in Iran and in this laboratory and we are quite satisfied with its performance. Our hydrolic dynamometer works up to 10,000 rpm and can stop an engine up to 80 horsepower. The good thing about this dynamometer is that it requires no foreign parts and no fuel, because it works with water. Thusfar, we have obtained about 50 or 60 different diagrams of the existing engines in the factory with this apparatus, which has helped us such that in the meetings and contracts with Talbot or other companies, we will be able to face them with a full hand of scientific evidence. Among the successes of this project for us was the issue of the (tort) engines which were sold to this factory. These engines had technical problems. The experts of this factory had found the problem but did not have the scientific proof to warrant rejecting them.

This project helped us to study these engines and we discovered that they were not (tort) engines at all, that merely their ratio of compression had gone up, and that they were no different from the common 1600 engines; no change had been made in them. The scientific proof resulted in our being able to get the company to pay a fine. I think in the history of this factory, this was the first meeting in which we were able to condemn the experts of a large European company. They accepted our scientific evidence and even gave their official signatures.

Dr Savadkuhi then said: We have another project to make the country self-sufficient in regards to two-cylinder engines which must be used in the villages. Since we are the only engine manufacturing factory in Iran and can produce blocks, cylinder heads, and other parts, we have designed a two-cylinder engine from the 1600 engine. With the same casts, the same casting system, and the same production line, we will be able to offer two-cylinder engines, after the completion stages. Of course, we have prepared a test sample. The block for this engine was modeled after the 1600 block and the 1600 cylinder head. Changes have been made in the valve system, exhaust muffler, and crank shaft to convert the four-cylinder to a two-cylinder engine. The crank shaft of this engine was built in this factory. Tabriz machine manufacturing factory can build this engine. The fueling system of the engine was changed from horizontal to vertical and most of the parts which are made in this factory will be used in this engine as well. Generally, two-cylinder engines are less balanced than four-cylinder engines. However, this engine is well balanced. Fewer cylinders increases the dynamic vibration. We have tried to minimize the vibration with (felanvil) design and calculations. This engine will be used in rural equipment and agricultural machinery in the fields for generator pumps, water pumps, and other equipment.

Explaining the completed projects, Dr Savadkuhi said concerning the contracts: We are negotiating with various Japanese, French, and Italian companies to purchase driving forces, gear boxes, differentials, and suspension systems. Since we feel we have a responsibility to sufficiently understand the proposed plans before negotiating, we have studied them ahead of time in the research center. For instance, there was a discussion concerning the signing of a contract with France and importing the Peugeot driving force to be installed on the Peykan body. Before starting any negotiations, we took an engine from that company and, with the help of our experts, we installed it on a Peykan body. All the problems concerning this conversion were studied and dealt with in the research division. We felt that the Peugeot driving force was not appropriate for installation on a Peykan body, even though they would have liked to do so. If we had not done this research before the negotiations, we would have blindly entered this action, at great economic expense to this factory in the future which could not have been made up.

After four or five months of study, we installed the Peugeot engine on a Peykan body. This car runs with a Peugeot driving force, including the suspension system, engine, gear box, differential, and wheels. But the changes create many problems in our body production line. Also, this engine occupies a large amount of space. The Peykan body does not have sufficient room for this engine. Also, the parts of the suspension system and the wheels must be substantially changed, which would not be economically feasible. Since studying it, we can totally reject this project.

The converted parts which are directly connected to the steering wheel, the wheels, and the driving force of the rear wheels include very sensitive parts and are very costly. These parts include the engine arms, ram, console, the parts that hold the gear box, the universal joints, the differential case, parts to hold the rear spring bar, and the part which holds the rear shock absorbers. These are mostly sensitive parts and would result in costs for the factory which make it infeasible for us.

Dr Savadkuhi then explained about the project to build new pickup chassis and the history of pickups at Iran National. He said the present pickups of Iran National which are on the market are those which were built on Peykan passenger cars through the creative work of a number of the technicians of this factory. Since this conversion was done without study and scientific engineering and since, basically, the conversion of a passenger car to a pickup cannot be done without major changes, they have certain problems, although they are functioning well and are in use. However, the role of the research division in designing and in promoting self-sufficiency is in the area of converting vehicles designed for private use into service vehicles. For

this reason, we accepted the proposal to design pickup chassis. This design started two or three years ago. Thusfar, two or three samples of pickup chassis have been made. In the pickup chassis which have thusfar been built in Iran, no attention has been paid to the conversion and distribution of force and weight between the front and rear axles. These projects have been completed stage by stage. Finally, the research division volunteered to build a well-engineered pickup. For this reason, the pickup which has now been built is sound. We have distributed the weight between the axles, added about 30 cm to the length and eliminated the weakness resulting from the one-piece universal joint by designing a two-piece universal joint. Also, this pickup has a very simple chassis design which can be produced domestically and the presses in this factory can make this chassis, which has been designed in two pieces.

The shape of the chassis has been well engineered. From the standpoint of the balance of the vehicle and the way the body sits on the chassis, the chassis is perfectly ideal. Another advantage of this design is that in the event of an accident, the suspension system and the driving force will not be damaged. For repairs, the body on the driver's side can be detached from the chassis and remounted after the repairs have been made.

In these designs, we have tried to make minimal changes in the parts already available in the factory. This design incorporates mostly parts that are presently built by Iranian workers so that we do not need anything as a result of the changes in the molds, which could be costly. In regards to the fuel tank, we have equipped this pickup with a 65-liter fuel tank. The gasoline tank is very simply placed in the space between the two parts of the chassis, through the front and rear axles. The natural gas capsules are located opposite this tank, which, from the perspective of safety, protects it in the case of accident or collision. The system for the exhaust fuel from the engine, which includes the exhaust pipe, is designed in such a way that it does not come in contact with the natural gas and gasoline tanks.

In the construction stages, the chassis is welded together. The whole suspension system and the driving force are mounted on the chassis. The body is separate from the chassis. The hauling compartment is separate from the driver's compartment, but we have tried to balance the two compartments. One of the advantages of this pickup is that it has a more powerful engine. The design for the production of such an engine is now available to Iran National factory and we will be able to convert the 1600 engines to a high (bakobel) with a cylinder capacity of 1850. We have studied the resources and we know that it can be done. However, until this plan is implemented, we have eliminated the 725 engines mounted on deluxe passenger cars and replaced them

with an engine from the (Talbot) company called the 1850, with high (bakobel) and pulling power, which conforms to the mountainous terrain and the country's roads, given the weight load on pickups and other vehicles. We will only work on the fueling system of these engines and we will change them from the horizontal to vertical position. We in the research division will try to make up for the weakness resulting from the basic design of the engine. This pickup can easily be converted into an ambulance. We are able to offer an ambulance with sufficient capacity made in the Iran National factories by Iranian workers.

Dr Savadkuhi then said, concerning whether or not the experiences of others have also been used: In designing and building the new pickup chassis, we have used the experiences of the Mazda 1600 pickup and, through scientific study of the products of the automobile industries, we have also benefited from their experiences. However, our design is completely independent and quite different from other pickups which have been built, including the Mazda 1600 pickup.

The design for our ambulance is complete. The reason for this project being experimental at this stage is that it must be perfected before the final project is implemented. All the parts used in this ambulance, the moldings and presses and even some of the parts, are taken from the parts in minibuses. In the ambulance design, there is sufficient room for first aid equipment, places for nurses to sit, and sufficient length for the patient. The back of the ambulance has two doors. One opens out towards the ground on which the patient on the wheeled stretcher enters the ambulance and the second door opens upward. By shutting these two doors, the back of the ambulance is easily closed.

This design can also be converted into 12-passenger taxis in the city. For this reason, we have equipped this vehicle with an 1850 engine which will have sufficient power.

Because of this vehicle's chassis, it has sufficient power to carry heavier loads as well.

Concerning the design and construction of the body, first our designers draw up about 50-60 designs. Taking into consideration economic matters, production aspects, the simplicity of the parts, the self-sufficiency of the country, and non-dependence on foreign assistance, we choose the best design and implement it.

Showing the design for the ambulance, Dr Savadkuhi said: This is the final design for our ambulance, which is, of course, like the design on a planchet in that changes might still be made in practice. Even after it has been produced, again, other changes might be made to economize this design.

Concerning the future plans of the research section, Dr Savadkuhi said: Our future plans include small vehicles equipped with two-cylinder engines and a design to change the wheel system and suspension of the manufactured vehicles from (makurson) to flat.

We have a plan to use larger wheel rims and larger tires for new pickup chassis.

We also have a design for the brakes of the Peykan, because the present system is dangerous. We intend to change it to a dual suspension system so that the rear wheels operate independent of the front wheels.

There are other projects in the works by our body designers which include changes to reduce wind resistance.

In conclusion, Dr Engineer Savadkuhi added: Compared to the self-sacrifices of our other compatriots on the fronts, our activities are insignificant. We are ashamed even to show our work; but we consider this also a front on which we are fighting for the economic independence of the country.

9593

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LAW TO NATIONALIZE FOREIGN TRADE PUBLISHED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 26, 27 May 82

[Chapter 1: Articles 1-4]

[26 May 82 p 4]

[Text]

Chapter 1 — General

Article 1:

For the purpose of nationalization of foreign trade, specified in Principle 44 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ministry of Commerce is dutybound to establish the following units on the basis of this Law and the statutes concerned, to be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis).

- a) Purchase Centers
- b) Export Centers
- c) Representative Agencies abroad
- d) Commercial Services Companies
- e) Accounting and Auditing Services Organization.

Article 2:

By virtue of the noble verse of Qur'an and the purport of the principles related to the foreign policy in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for the purpose of the materialization of the principle "neither East nor West" in the foreign commercial relations of the state, the Ministry of Commerce is, in cooperation with other ministries concerned, duty-bound to draw up the executive policy of foreign trade and the annual regulations of exports and imports, with due regards to the following points, and to announce them after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

- a) Prevention of the economic, political and cultural domination of unbelievers and foreigners over Muslims, and non-reliance of the country on one economic and political pole.
- b) Giving priority to commercial exchanges and transactions to Muslim and Mostaz'af (deprived) nations of the world, regarding extension of trade relations with them, taking account of the interests of Islamic Republic of Iran.
- c) Avoiding transactions that are forbidden from the points of view of Islam.
- d) Protection of domestic productions.
- e) Decrease of tendency towards luxuries and variety in consumption, and presentation of the consumption models with Islamic standards.
- f) Forecasting and provision for import requirements.
- g) Quantitative and qualitative extension and improvement of exports.
- h) Establishment of balance between imports and exports.

i) Non-reliance of exports on a single product.

Chapter 2 — Purchase and Export Centers

Section A. Purchase Centers.

Article 3

For the purpose of the purchase of goods, materials and commercial services from abroad, the centers of purchase of all imported goods required in the country will be established after the approval of the statutes, within a maximum four months after the approval of the executive regulations of this law by the Ministry of Commerce.

NOTE: Henceforth instead of the phrase "relevant goods, materials and commercial services in this law, the word "goods" will be used.

[27 May 82 p 3]

[Text]

Article 4

After its formation, each purchase center is dutybound to effect independently the purchase of all the quantities of the imported goods required in the country from each of the items that are subject of its activities within a maximum four years.

NOTE: 1 — As long as the purchase of all imported goods from those that are the subject of these activities is not effected by any of the purchase centers, the purchase of those goods shall be effected by others (public, cooperative and private sectors) exclusively under the supervision and control of that center. The extent, conditions and the manner of supervision and control shall be determined in the executive regulations of this law.

NOTE: 3 — The purchase of special goods, needed for the activities of ministries, as well as governmental organizations, institutes and companies, which undertake to purchase those goods in accordance with special laws, is not covered by the regulations contained in this article and its notes, and shall be effected with information of, and coordination with, the centers.

The manner of coordination shall be on the basis of the regulations to be approved by the general assembly of the centers.

NOTE: The purchase centers are duty-bound to suggest to the High Council of the centers, the names and the types of that part of goods subject of the activities that they can undertake to purchase independently, and to announce for public information after confirmation by the Council and the approval of the general assembly of the centers.

NOTE: 4 — The purchase centers shall observe the following priorities, as the case may be.

A) Priority of undertaking the matter of purchase according to the importer of goods.

1) The goods that are purchased by the private sector from abroad.

2) The goods that are purchased by the cooperative sector from abroad.

3) The goods that are purchased by other units of the public sector from abroad.

B) Priority of undertaking the matter of purchase according to the type of goods.

1) Consumer goods

2) Intermediate goods.

3) Capital goods

C) Priority of undertaking the purchase according to the high value of goods.

MONTH'S ACTIVITIES OF AGRICULTURAL BANK PUBLISHED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 May 82 p 2

[Text]

The public relations office of the Agricultural Bank issued the following report on the statistics of the loans extended by the branch offices of this bank in various provinces of the country during the past month of Farvardin (March 21-April 21).

West Azarbaijan

A total sum of 200 million rials was extended to 937 farmers in this northwestern province for irrigation, cattle-breeding poultry-farming and other agricultural purposes.

Khuzestan:

A total amount of rials 55,010,000 was lent to 477 farmers in this southwestern province for poultry-farming, cattle-breeding, the purchase of farming machines, irrigation and other agricultural plans.

Hamedan

Four hundred and twenty two farmers of the Hamedan Province (western Iran) received rials 131,714,000 in loans for various agricultural projects.

Khorasan

A total sum of 632 million rials was extended in loans to 5,091 farmers in this northeastern province of Iran for irrigation, cattle-breeding, poultry-farming, the purchase of farming machines and other agricultural plans.

Meanwhile, the farmers of Khorasan repaid 292 million rials of the bank's outstanding loans.

Bakhtaran

During the past month of Farvardin the branch offices of the Agricultural Bank in the Bakhtaran Province (western Iran) extended rials 142,919,000 in loans to 613 farmers for various agricultural projects.

Meanwhile, rials 66,431,000 of the bank's outstanding loans were repaid in this province.

Central Province

A total amount of 322 million rials was lent to 1,548 farmers in this province for irrigation, cattle-breeding, poultry-farming and other agricultural purposes.

Meanwhile, 273 million rials of the bank's outstanding loans were repaid by the farmers of the Central Province.

ELECTRIFICATION OF MORE VILLAGES ANNOUNCED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 May 82 p 2

[Text] Shahr-e Kurd

SHAHR-E KURD (IRNA) — Owing to efforts made by the committed brothers of the Construction Jihad of the Chahar-mahalo Bakhtiari Province (Western Iran), the inhabitants of 53 villages were supplied with electricity throughout the province during the past Iranian year. This was announced by the head of the electricity committee of the Construction Jihad of Chahar-mahalo Bakhtiari in an interview with the IRNA correspondent in Shahr-e Kurd, the capital of the province.

According to the interview 35 deep wells were provided with electricity and a workshop was set up in Shahr-e Kurd for the production of lampposts.

Kerman

KERMAN (IRNA) — Owing to the efforts of the workers of the Regional Electricity Company of Kerman (southeastern Iran) 179 villages were supplied with electricity networks throughout the province during the past Iranian year, it was announced by the spokesman of the public relations office of the company in an interview with IRNA.

While comparing the activities of the Regional Electricity Company of Kerman carried out after the victory of the Islamic Revolution with what had been done before the victory, the spokesman said, "Before the revolution, during the whole period of the Shah's monarchy only 173 villages had been brought under the coverage of electricity supply network in Kerman while in spite of all the difficulties which the nation has been facing since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 461 villages have been provided with electricity in this province."

"With regard to the self-sufficiency of the region in the agricultural and industrial fields," the spokesman added, "278 agricultural and industrial units were supplied with electricity by this company."

According to the spokesman operations are underway for the supply of electricity to 498 other villages all over the Kerman province.

KNESSET MEMBER YA'AQOVI PROPOSES UNILATERAL AUTONOMY PLAN

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Apr 82 p 9

[Article by Dan Margalit: "Unilateral Autonomy"]

[Text] Toward the end of his days, Moshe Dayan expressed confidence that the defeat of TELEM in the elections for the 10th Knesset would not diminish the prospects of his plan to institute unilateral autonomy in the Occupied Territories. It was not the parliamentary arithmetic that afforded a prospect for his idea but rather the emerging political reality. Dayan feared that the government headed by Menachem Begin had led the negotiations on autonomy to a dead end and the Israelis into becoming a "nation of masters," which would render the lives of the Palestinians intolerable. This situation would undermine the peace achievements with Egypt and would increase international pressures on Israel. With the goal of divesting us of both these hazards, he initiated a limiting of the friction with the Palestinian population as a unilateral step.

Portions of this concept activated elements far apart, starting with Ahud Ulmarat (Likud) and including Yosi Sarid (Alignment)--each for reasons of his own. Now there has been added to them Knesset Member Gad Ya'aqovi, whose visit to Washington convinced him of the need for a unilateral step that would preempt and weaken political attacks on Israel on the part of the United States. Ya'aqovi did not stop with an essay or a proclamation but rather developed the draft of a plan that he submitted for the attention of authoritative bodies of the Labor Party, who will deal with it shortly.

The renewed interest in the idea of unilateral autonomy was made necessary by the situation that developed with the approach of the deadline for withdrawal from the Sinai. Israeli figures and European correspondents who arrived in Jerusalem from Washington reported that they had heard harsh words from American officials in several areas: Israeli intransigence on the issue of autonomy after withdrawal from the Sinai would tend to cause Egypt to turn away from the Camp David process. With the aim of preventing this, the United States demanded that Begin prepare himself for concessions on the issue of the voting rights of the Arabs of East Jerusalem for the autonomy institutions and slow down the settlement process. These officials told West European journalists and Israelis who had visited Washington that American pressure on the Begin government is to be anticipated.

Formulation of the renewed proposal of Ya'aqovi--as well as the call on former ambassador Simha Dinitz to open a quick dialogue with Washington for coordination of positions on the Palestinian issue--are to a great extent the result of the impressions gained from the emerging position of the American administration. To these have been added the bloody incidents in Judea and Samaria with the demonstrations protesting the government's policy of force against the local leadership on the West Bank. The strong hand sharpened friction and with it the interest in alternative ideas.

Ya'aqovi proceeded as a qualified surveyor. He placed the unilateral autonomy of Dayan over the map of the security regions of Yigal Allon, which had been a part of the Alignment platform, and by comparative measurements of the two arrived at a compromise proposal good for 3 to 5 years. His initiative calls for unilateral implementation of the autonomy plan over a part of the Palestinian population in most of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It is not intended for the general population over the entire area. It also differs from the Camp David definition that autonomy is for people and not for territories.

His application to the chairman of his party, Shimon Peres, was written with attention to the political sensitivity of the Alignment. He skirted full identification between it and the approach of Dayan, and it contains restrictions that still keep it from being irregular: that it is valid only in the event that there cannot be found a second side with which to agree, and, of course, that its principal goal is to prevent a crisis with the United States and thereby encourage the Fahd plan in the United States and Egypt.

According to the synthesis of Dayan and Allon, autonomy will be established in Judea and Samari excluding the area of Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and the Hebrew settlements. The Palestinians receive all of the authority delegated to local jurisdictions and Israel would withdraw from the urban centers on the West Bank, where [its occupation] causes heavy psychological pressure on it through its self-image as an oppressor and as one who is so pictured in American public opinion. Thus, Israeli-Palestinian and the Jewish-American friction will diminish. At the same time, there is nothing in this arrangement that would tend to eliminate the option either for the Allon plan or for establishment of the fixed autonomy in the Camp David agreement, Ya'aqovi believes. And that, when in the future there will be found Arab partners for proposals such as these.

The implication is that whoever supports a plan like this does not want to become involved in what is happening in the Arab cities. He is not concerned with which flag flies in Nablus and does not think that it is the business of the IDF to force merchants in Ramallah to open their businesses.

The plan has yet to pass the honing stages, which alone can settle on an internal Israeli clarification. Dayan did not see the dimensions of the risk in the proliferation of workers from the territories in the Israeli economy and the damage that this causes to Jewish society and its Zionist nature. Even the leftish-dovish branch in the Labor Party has not emblazoned on its socialist-Zionist banner the need to cease the process of casting all

manual labor in the Jewish economy on the shoulders of the laborers from the occupied territories. A change in the situation will be possible only through the establishment of a system of autonomy. When Israel ceases to be responsible for agriculture, for education and for electricity, it can also cease to deal with the matter of employment of the Palestinians. But no such section appears in the Ya'aqovi draft.

Many practical problems require clarification: Who will control water sources? When will Israel intervene in what takes place in Nablus and in Hebron? When hordes of protestors march or when they wave hostile flags?

Clearly it will not allow Palestinians to establish a government under the aegis of a one-sided process. Inasmuch as the discussion is about an arrangement that is being initiated by Israel, who is its implementer, Israel will be able to establish according to its own deliberations what are strategic, vital parameters for its security. It will need the permission of no one to remain along the length of the Jordan to prevent the transfer of heavy armaments to terrorists within the occupied territories and it will control the peaks of the mountains and main crossroads.

But there will be pragmatic problems. It is almost certain that a step that diminishes direct Israeli hegemony in the Arab cities would tend to raise to some degree the Palestinian terror threshold within the borders of the Green Line. This will be one of the heavy prices that Israel must pay--and will move to limit--in exchange for the political and social advantages that unilateral autonomy will provide. It will also encounter other complex problems, such as who will adjudicate between a Palestinian truck and a settler's van that collide on a road outside Samaria? And who will try a suspect for murdering a Jew or an Arab from ambush?

No one has a detailed plan, yet. Only a few at the upper echelons of the Likud and the Alignment have thus far evinced interest in these ideas. Two of the senior members of the Likud told Ya'aqovi of their interest in the matter. Clearly, the intricate details in a daring unilateral step will become clear only when the actual grappling with these ideas begins. For now, there is no one in the government who will place the proposal on the agenda.

8090

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ISRAEL

RAKAH INFLUENCE IN NAZARETH AMONG ARABS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Apr 82 p 11

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "RAKAH: Giving Intellectuals a Sense of Participation"]

[Text] From an organizational standpoint, Nazareth is the capital of the largest district of RAKAH [New Communist List]. The Nazareth District must collect 33 percent of the entire sum that is required for the party's fund drive; and Nazareth neither lags nor complains. According to the official report of RAKAH, the Nazareth District holds first place in the country and has succeeded in collecting 160 percent of its obligation. In second place is the Acre and Western Galilee District. This district is the center of 25 percent of the strength of RAKAH, and by the middle of March its collections had reached 140 percent of its obligation. Tel Aviv-Jaffa stands in third place and is estimated to make up 15 percent; the Triangle is fourth (at 13 percent) and Haifa is fifth (6 percent). Jerusalem is in last place and does not reach 2 percent.

The explanation of this phenomenon is not very surprising. In elections to the Knesset, too, the principal strength of RAKAH is derived from Arab voters in the eastern and western Galilee and the Triangle. In the political activism of the area, too, there is no feeling that RAKAH exists outside of the Arab regions. Even the party newspaper, 'AL-Ittihad, which devoted 5 pages of its most recent edition to a detailed report on all the events of the Land Day strike, did not report to its readers on any activism at all beyond the concentrations of the Arab population. It was in the Nazareth region that two of the four stoppages took place. The number of detainees in this region exceeded 40 of some 100 persons, who, according to the dispatches in this newspaper, were detained on 30 March and beyond (in this number they include as well all of the people who were arrested for any time at all by the police for purposes of interrogation).

Men Only

This week I received from a reliable RAKAH member a pamphlet on what is taking place in the Nazareth District. The pamphlet, prepared for the forthcoming convention of the Nazareth District of RAKAH, contains a package of surprising facts about what is going on within this leading district of RAKAH; "Our

financial situation has improved over what it has been in the past even though we had to expend sizable amounts from the district treasury on the election campaign." The style is not particularly exhilarating, but the message is clear. RAKAH in Galilee District has more money in 1982 than it had in 1980 despite the expenditures in two election campaigns a year ago for the Knesset and the Histadrut. And despite the collection of membership dues in the party "which has improved, it is still far from the required level."

The report may easily irritate the reader who is untrained in the evasive style it uses regarding clear-cut numbers. The increase in the membership roll is given in percentages, as is the circulation of newspapers. But the authors note specifically that there are 22 paid employees (a district secretary, 3 employees in Nazareth, 6 employees of the party in the region, 2 in the newspapers of the party, 3 women employees, 5 youth employees, and to these are added the member of the audit committee, Min'am Jarjura, and Mrs Samira Khoury, a national coordinator for women's activity, and ideological and organizational support by activist members in the Central Committee).

Another source of strength for RAKAH in this district is worthy of specific note here: The number of students in the district attending foreign universities is 162, of which 146 were sent by RAKAH to study in socialist countries and 16 left to study on their own.

There are 26 branches in the district, of which 3 are small, nothing more than "frozen cells that are not growing" ('Ilut, Sullam and Devoriya). The branches in Akhsal and Devoriya are also "frozen"; the branches of the large village of Maghar and of Rina and Sha'av "have lost members over the past 2 years." And the percentage of females among the membership of RAKAH in the Nazareth District is 14 (as compared with 12 2 years ago).

But the most surprising bit of information with respect to the communist party is set in a carping tone: In 10 branches there are only isolated females. Authors of the report urge members to work to correct this inequity, to recruit women to the ranks of the party and also to be concerned with collecting subscription fees for the newspapers.

The authors of the report do not merely deplore the absence of women from the ranks of the revolutionaries. They complain that the party does not operate sufficiently among the ranks of the workers, is unsuccessful in establishing an apparatus for farmers and has not succeeded in maintaining a trade office for the municipal issue. In short, it would appear that RAKAH is no different from the other parties--the apparatus is concerned about itself and makes do with the stimulation of impulses within the circles that can easily be moved to action. For example, among the youth. The authors note with regret that the working youth have not enjoyed the appropriate attention. They also note that among the Arab population there are today some 5,000 academicians and some 3,000 students, as well as 20,000 high school pupils; the growth of the intellectual class requires more in-depth activity among this sector.

To Attract the Intellectuals

"The basis for our partnership with the academicians is the common struggle against discrimination and national suppression, to eliminate them, and for the assurance of civil and national equality," and to attract these circles to cooperative effort with RAKAH in HADASH, the authors of the report propose that "hundreds of intellectuals should be drawn to active participation in the press of the party and in cultural activity of HADASH. Only if they are made to feel that the party welcomes them as partners in actuality, in planning and in implementing, will it be possible to isolate the elements that are attempting to make it seem as if the party is dominating (the academicians)." But the authors of the report are not in effect calling for a partnership but rather for giving the impression of partnership, and in another place they do not even hesitate to note that "in our activity, on the issue of forming a front, we have warned and are warning against isolationism, neglect of the issue of unity in the ranks, contempt for the role of our partners, and at the same time we warn against abdication of the role of the party that leads." This kind of abdication will bring about the ideological domination of the petty bourgeoisie over the front and its activity, and the limiting of the function of the party as a leader of the nation's struggle, "particularly in the face of the tendency of these elements with an extreme rightist and nationalist perspective to take over RAKAH."

In other words, RAKAH is called upon to walk a tightrope. To function among educated youth against the policy of the government, to give it a sense that it is a partner in planning and in implementation, but at the same time to prevent it from participating in actuality. How many active members are there in RAKAH branches in the Nazareth District? In the 26 branches there are registered today only close to 1,500 members. During the past 2 years, 27 percent of today's membership was added to the party. This is an increase of 35 percent in the number of party members since the beginning of 1980. But many members have abandoned the party, and 162 left, as has been noted, to study abroad, so that the increase in effect is 20 percent. This is indicative of a significant turnover in the ranks of the party. The authors of the report are not at all satisfied with the reduction in party membership.

The upper echelon of the Nazareth District of RAKAH calls on the branches to take the initiative in establishing institutes and promises them "serious support" from the funds of the district and the central. It calls for the preparation of branches toward an association of friendship with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria and for occupational activity for organizing the exploited workers of the tailoring workshops in the Arab villages. And above all, the report calls on the members to fulfill their obligation toward the party and to prepare themselves for the day when the organ of the party (apparently, starting from the beginning of 1983) will appear as a daily newspaper--and all of this while RAKAH is the single party functioning and operating a serious apparatus and a varied press among the Arabs of Israel.

The Labor Party, the second largest party entity among the Arab population, maintains fewer than a dozen paid workers for the entire Arab sector throughout the country, including Director of the Minorities Branch Mr Ra'anah Cohen and his secretary. Mr Cohen promises that in another 2 weeks elections will be conducted in Nazareth for the first administration of the Labor Party branch in the city.

HELICOPTER LANDING PLATFORM DESIGNED

Jerusalem INNOVATION in English No 77, Apr 82 pp 3, 4


[Text] Lod--A dual purpose system has been designed by Israel Aircraft Industries, to provide helicopter landing and storage facilities aboard small ships. This sharply enhances the capabilities of such vessels for military purposes--for instance, in anti-submarine warfare--and also for some civilian uses, such as search and rescue missions.

The compact structure can be installed on vessels of 400 tons and up. It consists of a raised platform, from which helicopters take off and where they land. When the copter has to be stored, the landing platform is simply lowered to the deck. A roof slides over the stored machine, to protect it; that cover is strong enough to accommodate a second landing helicopter.

It takes only about two minutes to store a landed copter, or to bring a stored machine to the raised takeoff position.

The entire system is self-contained, requiring no support whatsoever from ship systems. It can also be supplied as a removable item, to be installed only when planned missions make it necessary.

Designs so far completed can accommodate several helicopter models, such as the Bell 212 and 222, and the Navy Lynx. In each case, provision has been made to protect rotor blades from damage during the vertical transportation stage.



CSO: 4400/296

R&D CORPORATION STEPS UP ACTIVITIES

Jerusalem INNOVATION in English No 77, Apr 82 p 4

[Text]

Tel Aviv — Recent decisions in the Ministries of Finance and of Industry and Trade will inject some IS4m. in new funds into the Israel Research and Development Corporation during the current year. That firm, established in the latter 1960s, has been charged with the support of promising, but still highly risky new enterprises based on advanced R&D.

The company provides such support by investing in the ventures it finds suitable; its participation always gives it a significant minority status (at least 26%, but usually less than half) with an important voice in the policy making process. Once the initial stage has been passed and the enterprise has reached safe ground, IRDC will agree to sell its interest, often to the majority shareholders.

Over the years, IRDC has participated in several highly successful ventures, such as Makor Chemicals and SciTex. Both of those holdings, and several others have long since been realized. In such instances a certain profit is made, since the minimum sale price is based on the company's actual investment, plus interest, both corrected for inflationary erosion.

At present, IRDC is directly involved in the following four manufacturing firms:

— Popper Engineering, makers of vibrational materials handling equipment (see *INNOVATION* 70, September 1981). Popper Engineering is now engaged

in an R&D program for the development of a computerized weighing system, that will indicate in a single operation the gross and net weights of a container's liquid contents.

— Xi Systems are the developers of sophisticated computerized plotters, for various demanding applications. The company's products, for instance, are an integral part of pilotless reconnaissance airplane systems, developed and manufactured by Israel Aircraft Industries.

— Compulite produces microprocessor controlled systems for the control of complex stage lighting setups. Already installed in a number of important theaters in Israel and abroad, this system enhances flexibility and control, while reducing costs significantly.

— Conversion Systems have developed high performance arc welding equipment with a broad range of attachments. One item, for instance, interfaces the welder with NC systems, for automatic operation; another turns it into a battery charger.

The government's decision to make new funds available to IRDC will enable the company to expand the scope of its operations considerably. Several projects already are being examined, and additional proposals are invited.

CSO: 4400/296

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

DRUZE GOVERNOR OF RAMALLAH--A Druze lieutenant colonel, Yigal Mazi-ad, who has performed senior functions in the IDF, has been appointed Governor of Ramallah. This is the second appointment of a Druze military person in the civilian administration of Judea and Samaria. The previous appointment was that of Maj Amid Zi-ad as governor of Jenin. Heretofore, Druze officers have served in the territories within the Border Patrol. According to defense sources there is perhaps an innovation in the integration of Druzes into the civilian administration, but there is no significance to it whatever, aside from the fact that these people have been appointed to their current assignments on the basis of relevant considerations and against a background of confidence in their ability to conduct the affairs of the cities to which they have been assigned. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Apr 82 p 16] 8090

NEGEV RAIL PLAN--Transport Minister Haim Corfu said on Monday that Israel would have to decide within two months whether to accept a Canadian offer to finance and build a railway line from Sdom to Eilat. The alternative is to transfer phosphates from Sdom to Zefa for processing and then to Ashdod. The Canadians estimate the cost of the project at \$200 million. Corfu was speaking at Ben-Gurion Airport on leaving for Canada with the manager of the railways, Zvi Tsafrir, to discuss the project with the Canadian authorities. (Itim) [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 May 82 p 10]

GALILEE NATURAL GAS--The first oil well to be drilled between Elin Gedi and the Hula Valley in the Afro-Syrian Rift turned up traces of natural gas at 1,730 metres. The find is now being examined for its commercial potential. The discovery was made Saturday night at a well called Zemah I at Kibbutz Masada 4 kilometres north of Lake Kinneret. Yesterday, the Energy Ministry cautioned that until the quality and extent of the gas is thoroughly examined, no conclusions can be drawn about its commercial potential. Such an examination will take several days. The drill, done by the government-owned Oil Exploration Investment Company (Hanah), will be extended down to 2,100 metres to check additional strata. The well is considered an important first step in penetrating the geological strata in an area heretofore unexplored. The well at Tzuk Tamrur I near Arad, that turned up several barrels of oil about 10 days ago, is now producing at a rate of about 30 barrels a day. The commercial potential of the well has not yet been determined. The well is owned by Hanah and the government drilling companies Lapidot and Naphtha, which have the largest shares, and Paz Oil Exploration, Delek, Fedoil, the Haifa refineries and private investors. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 May 82 p 3]

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